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GOVERNMENT SPEECH 2.0 
HELEN NORTON† & DANIELLE KEATS CITRON‡ 
ABSTRACT 
New expressive technologies continue to transform the ways in 
which members of the public speak to one another. Not surprisingly, 
emerging technologies have changed the ways in which government 
speaks as well. Despite substantial shifts in how the government and 
other parties actually communicate, however, the Supreme Court to date 
has developed its government speech doctrine—which recognizes “gov-
ernment speech” as a defense to First Amendment challenges by plain-
tiffs who claim that the government has impermissibly excluded their 
expression based on viewpoint—only in the context of disputes involving 
fairly traditional forms of expression. In none of these decisions, moreo-
ver, has the Court required government publicly to identify itself as the 
source of a contested message to satisfy the government speech defense 
to a First Amendment claim. The Court’s failure to condition the gov-
ernment speech defense on the message’s transparent identification as 
governmental is especially mystifying because the costs of such a re-
quirement are so small when compared to its considerable benefits in 
ensuring that government remains politically accountable for its expres-
sive choices.  
This Article seeks to start a conversation about how courts—and the 
rest of us—might re-think our expectations about government speech in 
light of government’s increasing reliance on emerging technologies that 
have dramatically altered expression’s speed, audience, collaborative 
nature, and anonymity. It anticipates the next generation of government 
speech disputes in which certain associations and entanglements be-
tween government and private speakers complicate the government 
speech question. By adding to these challenges, government’s increasing 
use of newer technologies that vary in their interactivity and transpar-
ency may give the Court additional reason to re-examine its government 
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speech jurisprudence. “Government Speech 2.0” thus refers not only to 
the next generation of government speech, but also to the possibility that 
government’s increasing reliance on emerging expressive technologies 
may help inspire the next generation of government speech doctrine: one 
more appropriately focused on ensuring government’s meaningful politi-
cal accountability for its expressive choices.  
INTRODUCTION 
New expressive technologies continue to transform the ways in 
which members of the public speak to one another. Not surprisingly, 
emerging technologies have changed the ways in which government 
speaks as well. For example, the Obama Administration has instructed 
executive agencies to maximize opportunities for using such technolo-
gies to enhance its provision of services to, and its interaction with, the 
public.1 The White House has an official blog where it discusses policy 
and embeds YouTube videos.2 The State Department runs a social net-
work site that facilitates discussions about cultural exchange programs;3 
it also maintains an embassy in Second Life designed to “inform, influ-
ence, and engage the world.”4 The Federal Emergency Management 
Agency allows its YouTube subscribers to learn about its operations in 
communities across America and comment on its disaster response and 
recovery.5 The Center for Disease Control provides alerts to the public 
through social media sites like Facebook and Twitter.6 The Pentagon 
uses these tools to “spread the military’s message,”7 and the Army’s 
website includes a virtual recruiter.8  
State and local governments also increasingly rely on networked 
technologies to communicate with the public. To cite just a few exam-
ples, the city of Portland, Oregon publishes its crime statistics on its 
“Crimemapper” website, and the Kansas State Highway Patrol similarly 
  
 1. See, e.g., Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009) (exhort-
ing executive departments and agencies to “use innovative tools, methods, and systems to cooperate 
among themselves, across all levels of Government, and with nonprofit organizations, businesses, 
and individuals in the private sector”); see also Press Release, White House Press Secretary, White 
House Announces Open Government Website, Initiative (May 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/White-House-Announces-Open-Government-Website-
Initiative/ (announcing plan for engaging public through White House blog, wiki, and website).  
 2. The White House Blog, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
 3. ExchangesConnect, http://connect.state.gov (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
 4. Victor E. Riche, Presentation to the U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Government 2.0: Pri-
vacy and Best Practices Workshop (June 22, 2009); L. Gordon Crovitz, Information Age: From 
Wikinomics to Government 2.0, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2008, at A13. 
 5. The Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA’s YouTube Channel, 
http://www.youtube.com/user/fema?blend=1&ob=4 (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
 6. See Chris Snyder, Government Agencies Make Friends with New Media, Epicenter (Mar. 
25, 2009), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/03/government-agen/.  
 7. Gregory S. Williams, Pentagon Using Social Network Sites to Recruit, Medianews (May 
4, 2009), http://www.mail-archive.com/medianews@etskywarn.net/msg03766.html. 
 8. Id. 
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posts information about traffic accidents, injuries, and fatalities online.9 
The Governor of California sends messages to followers and responds to 
their suggestions via Twitter.10  
For a sense of what we might shortly expect, consider the following 
scenario posed by Dan Froomkin: 
Imagine a White House Web site where the home page isn’t just a 
static collection of transcripts and press releases, but a window into 
the roiling intellectual foment of the West Wing. Imagine a White 
House Web site where staffers maintain blogs in which they write 
about who they are and what they are working on; where some meet-
ings are streamed in live video; where the president’s daily calendar 
is posted online; where major policy proposals have public collabora-
tive workspaces, or wikis; where progress towards campaign prom-
ises is tracked on a daily basis; and where anyone can sign up for 
customized updates by e-mail, text message, RSS feed, Twitter, or 
the social network of their choice.11  
Despite these substantial shifts in how the government and other 
parties actually communicate, however, the Supreme Court to date has 
developed its “recently minted”12 government speech doctrine only in the 
context of disputes involving fairly traditional forms of expression: the 
spoken13 and written14 word, advertisements in print and electronic 
form,15 and public monuments.16 This doctrine recognizes “government 
speech” as a defense to First Amendment challenges by plaintiffs who 
claim that the government has impermissibly excluded their expression 
based on viewpoint. In none of these decisions has the Court required 
government to identify itself publicly as the source of a contested mes-
  
 9. Daniel Castro & Robert Atkinson, The Next Wave of E-Government, State Tech, 
http://www.statetechmag.com/events/updates/the-next-wave-of-e-government.html (last visited May 
19, 2010). 
 10. See Emily Montandon, Do Twitter and Other Social Networks Shield Anonymous Com-
plainers on Topics like Health Care Reform?, GOV’T TECH., Nov. 2, 2009, at 6. 
 11. Dan Froomkin, It’s Time for a Wiki White House, Nieman Watchdog Nov. 25, 2008, 
http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=background.view&backgrounddid=00307. 
For more extensive discussion of the benefits as well as the dangers of government’s use of Web 2.0 
and similar expressive technologies, see Danielle Keats Citron, Fulfilling Government 2.0’s Promise 
With Robust Privacy Protections, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (describing govern-
ment’s increasing use of social network sites and urging government to treat Facebook, Twitter, and 
similar sites “as one-way mirrors, where individuals can see government’s activities and engage in 
policy discussions but where government cannot use, collect, or distribute individuals’ social media 
information”).  
 12. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139 (2009) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). 
 13. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 202–03 (1991) (health care providers’ discussions 
with patients at family planning clinics). 
 14. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413–14, 425–26 (2006) (prosecutor’s memoran-
dum criticizing the police). 
 15. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (television and print 
campaign promoting beef products). 
 16. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131 (monuments donated by private party for display by 
government in public park). 
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sage to satisfy the government speech defense to a First Amendment 
claim.  
The Court’s current approach thus fails to recognize that govern-
ment expression’s value springs primarily from its capacity to inform the 
public of its government’s principles and priorities. The public can assess 
government’s positions only when the public can tell that the government 
is speaking. The Court’s failure to condition the government speech de-
fense on the message’s transparent identification as governmental is es-
pecially mystifying because the costs of such a requirement are so small 
when compared to its considerable benefits in ensuring that government 
remains politically accountable for its expressive choices. Deference to 
government, more than any other principle, seems to explain the Court’s 
decisions. 
The Court’s government speech doctrine—already slow to de-
velop—has yet to grapple with the constitutional significance of gov-
ernment’s increasing use of Web 2.0 technologies and other substantial 
developments that may obscure government’s political accountability for 
its expressive choices. This Article seeks to start a conversation about 
how courts—and the rest of us—might re-think our expectations about 
government speech in light of government’s increasing reliance on 
emerging technologies that have dramatically altered expression’s speed, 
audience, collaborative nature,17 and anonymity.18 
To this end, Part I describes the brief history of government speech 
as a matter of constitutional law, critiquing the Supreme Court’s juris-
prudence in this area as too often failing to recognize that government 
expression’s constitutional value turns on its ability to enhance, rather 
than frustrate, government’s accountability to its electorate. It then an-
ticipates the next generation of government speech disputes and predicts 
that emerging challenges might—and, indeed, should—create pressure 
on the Court to reconsider its current doctrine. More specifically, it de-
scribes how certain associations and entanglements between government 
and private speakers complicate the government speech question. Gov-
ernment’s increasing use of newer technologies that vary in their interac-
tivity and transparency will only add to these challenges, and thus may 
give the Court additional reason to re-examine its government speech 
jurisprudence.  
  
 17. See Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459, 
1504 (“[T]he Internet as a tool of mass communication [has] become only better, quicker, and more 
empowering for the ordinary individual. . . . [O]rdinary people [are enabled] to participate in the 
marketplace of ideas, potentially reaching audiences never imaginable before.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Carlisle George & Jackie Scerri, Web 2.0 and User-Generated Content: Legal 
Challenges in the New Frontier, J. INFO. L. & TECH (2007), http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/ 
law/elj/jilt/2007_2/george_scerri/george_scerri.pdf (“Discovering the identity of an online publisher 
. . . can sometimes be difficult. . . . [T]here may be situations where an IP address cannot be traced to 
an individual, such as where a person logs on using a roaming IP, or where a person logs on from an 
Internet Café.”). 
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Part II first identifies a typology of the different information-age 
technologies that the government now uses to communicate with the 
public. It then recommends adjustments to the government speech doc-
trine that would require government to identify itself affirmatively as the 
source of contested expression as a condition of claiming the government 
speech defense to First Amendment challenges. Because this principle is 
equally true for both offline and online communicative technologies, the 
form of expressive technology should not affect this analysis.19 “Gov-
ernment Speech 2.0” thus refers not only to the next generation of gov-
ernment speech, but also to the possibility that government’s increasing 
reliance on emerging expressive technologies may help inspire the next 
generation of government speech doctrine: one more appropriately fo-
cused on ensuring government’s meaningful political accountability for 
its expressive choices.  
PART I: THE SUPREME COURT’S BRIEF AND CHECKERED HISTORY WITH 
GOVERNMENT SPEECH  
Because government must speak to govern effectively,20 it has en-
gaged in expressive activity since its inception.21 The U.S. Supreme 
  
 19. For a sampling of views on the longstanding question of whether First Amendment doc-
trine should vary according to the type of expressive technologies involved, see Citizens United v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 891 (2010) (“We must decline to draw, and then redraw, 
constitutional lines based on the particular media or technology used to disseminate political speech 
from a particular speaker.”); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868–70 (1997) (describing the Court’s 
“special justifications for the regulation of the broadcast media that are not applicable to other 
speakers” and concluding that there is “no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny 
that should be applied” to the Internet); Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User 
Control: Renewing the Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media, 
104 YALE L.J. 1619, 1633–34 (1995) (calling for fundamental change in First Amendment doctrine 
in response to the “revolutionary” nature of emerging expressive technologies); Anne Wells 
Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First Amendment in 
Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1647 (1995) (“The critical question is whether ‘new wine can be 
poured successfully into an old bottle,’ or whether new legal norms must be devised for the govern-
ance of the Networld.”) (citation omitted); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L. A. Powe, Jr., Converging 
First Amendment Principles for Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719, 1720 
(1995) (urging courts to discard the notion of special rules for broadcasters and instead realize “that 
traditional First Amendment principles—not yet another set of unique rules—are quite well suited to 
guide and constrain public regulation of these new technologies”); Lawrence Lessig, The Path of 
Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1743 (1995) (discussing the debate over whether “this new space, 
cyberspace, [should] be regulated by analogy to the regulation of other space, not quite cyber, or 
should we give up analogy and start anew”); Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 
85 VA. L. REV. 1163, 1167 (1999) (“Reno’s one rule for the entire Internet may begin to lose its 
luster and perhaps feel ridiculous. The great variation among Internet applications is hard to fit into 
one First Amendment box.”).  
 20. See 2 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 723 (1947) 
(“Now it is evident that government must itself talk and write and even listen.”); THOMAS I. 
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 698 (1970) (“Participation by the government 
in the system of freedom of expression is an essential feature of any democratic society. It enables 
the government to inform, explain, and persuade—measures especially crucial in a society that 
attempts to govern itself with a minimum use of force. Government participation also greatly en-
riches the system; it provides the facts, ideas, and expertise not available from other sources.”); 
Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Fo-
rum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1825 (1987) (“[I]t is probably not too outlandish an exaggeration to 
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Court did not recognize “government speech” as a constitutional law 
doctrine, however, until quite recently. In a series of decisions beginning 
in 1991 with Rust v. Sullivan,22 the Court has, in fits and starts, sketched 
out its emerging doctrine, which insulates the government’s own speech 
from First Amendment challenges by plaintiffs who seek to alter or join 
that expression.23 Political accountability mechanisms such as voting and 
lobbying then provide the sole recourse for those displeased by their gov-
ernment’s expressive choices.24  
A. The Doctrine’s Beginnings 
The Supreme Court identifies Rust v. Sullivan as the beginning of 
its government speech jurisprudence.25 After considering a First 
Amendment challenge to federal regulations that barred federally funded 
family planning clinics from engaging in abortion counseling, refer-
ral, or other expression related to abortion, the majority found no 
constitutional violation: 
To hold that the Government unconstitutionally discriminates on the 
basis of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program dedicated to 
advance certain permissible goals, because the program in advancing 
  
conclude that government organizations would grind to a halt were the Court seriously to prohibit 
viewpoint discrimination in the internal management of speech.”). 
 21. See generally JOSEPH TUSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND (1977); MARK G. YUDOF, 
WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983). 
 22. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 23. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (explaining that the 
government’s own speech is “exempt” from free speech clause scrutiny); Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (“The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation 
of private speech; it does not regulate government speech. A government entity has the right to 
‘speak for itself.’ Indeed it is not easy to imagine how government could function if it lacked this 
freedom.”) (citations omitted). 
 24. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) 
(“When the government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a particular 
idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy. If the 
citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary position.”); 
Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is the 
very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view on (in modern times, at least) 
innumerable subjects—which is the main reason we have decided to elect those who run the gov-
ernment, rather than save money by making their posts hereditary.”). Note, however, that constitu-
tional constraints other than the free speech clause may also apply to government’s own expression. 
See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“For even if the Free Speech Clause 
neither restricts nor protects government speech, government speakers are bound by the Constitu-
tion’s other proscriptions, including those supplied by the Establishment and Equal Protection 
Clauses.”). 
 25. See Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (“The Court in Rust did 
not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X 
amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have 
explained Rust on this understanding.”). Some Justices earlier signaled their growing recognition of 
the doctrine's possibility. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 
94, 140 n.7 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“Government is not restrained by the First Amendment 
from controlling its own expression.”); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1990) (noting 
that “[i]f every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds express a view 
with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great concern to the public would be limited to those 
in the private sector, and the process of government as we know it radically transformed”).  
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those goals necessarily discourages alternative goals, would render 
numerous Government programs constitutionally suspect. When 
Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to en-
courage other countries to adopt democratic principles . . . it was not 
constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing 
lines of political philosophy such as communism and fascism.26  
The dissent, in contrast, characterized the regulations as the gov-
ernment’s impermissibly viewpoint-based regulation of doctor–patient 
speech: “[T]he majority upholds direct regulation of dialogue between a 
pregnant woman and her physician when that regulation has both the 
purpose and the effect of manipulating her decision as to the continuance 
of her pregnancy.”27 
Nowhere in Rust does the term “government speech” appear. In a 
series of First Amendment disputes over the next decade in which gov-
ernment did not claim the contested speech as its own, however, the 
Court contrasted what it characterized as the government’s role as 
speaker in Rust from its role as a funder of private speech in other con-
texts.  
First, in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Vir-
ginia,28 the Court cited Rust in distinguishing the government’s own 
speech from a government program that provided financial support for 
private speech in the form of student organizations’ publications:  
[I]n Rust v. Sullivan, we upheld the government's prohibition on 
abortion-related advice applicable to recipients of federal funds for 
family planning counseling. . . . When the government disburses pub-
lic funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may 
take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is nei-
ther garbled nor distorted by the grantee.29  
Similarly, in Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin Sys-
tem v. Southworth,30 the Court again relied on Rust in distinguishing the 
government’s own speech from government programs that instead en-
courage diverse private speech, such as a public university’s fund for 
extracurricular student speech: 
Our decision ought not be taken to imply that in other instances the 
University, its agents or employees or—of particular importance—its 
faculty, are subject to the First Amendment analysis which controls 
  
 26. Rust, 500 U.S. at 194.  
 27. Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 28. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 29. Id. at 833; see also id. (“When the University determines the content of the education it 
provides, it is the University speaking, and we have permitted the government to regulate the content 
of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its 
own message.”). 
 30. 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
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in this case. Where the University speaks, either in its own name 
through its regents or officers, or in myriad other ways through its 
diverse faculties, the analysis likely would be altogether different. 
The Court has not held, or suggested, that when the government 
speaks the rules we have discussed come into play. When the gov-
ernment speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to ad-
vance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate 
and the political process for its advocacy. If the citizenry objects, 
newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary 
position.31  
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,32 the Court offered more de-
tail in identifying Rust as the genesis of its government speech doctrine, 
once again distinguishing government speech from government pro-
grams intended to fund private speech: 
The Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that 
the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X amounted to 
governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, 
however, we have explained Rust on this understanding. We have 
said that viewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in in-
stances in which the government is itself the speaker, or instances, 
like Rust, in which the government “used private speakers to transmit 
specific information pertaining to its own program.”33 
In contrast, as the Court observed, the Legal Services program: 
was designed to facilitate private speech, not to promote a govern-
mental message. Congress funded LSC grantees to provide attorneys 
to represent the interests of indigent clients. . . . The LSC lawyer, 
however, speaks on the behalf of his or her private, indigent cli-
ent. . . . The advice from the attorney to the client and the advocacy 
  
 31. Id. at 234–35 (citations omitted). Justice Souter further explained this distinction in his 
dissenting opinion in Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, where he distinguished government as 
patron of private art from government as speaker and buyer: 
[T]he government is of course entitled to engage in viewpoint discrimination: if the Food 
and Drug Administration launches an advertising campaign on the subject of smoking, it 
may condemn the habit without also having to show a cowboy taking a puff on the oppo-
site page; and if the Secretary of Defense wishes to buy a portrait to decorate the Penta-
gon, he is free to prefer George Washington over George the Third. 
Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 610–11 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting); see 
also id. at 611 (“The Government freely admits, however, that it neither speaks through the expres-
sion subsidized by the NEA, nor buys anything for itself with its NEA grants.”). Although the Finley 
majority did not characterize the NEA grants program as the government’s own speech, it concluded 
that different and more deferential rules may apply to arts funding decisions that require government 
to assess quality in allocating scarce resources from those that apply to government programs that 
“indiscriminately” encourage a diversity of views from private speakers. See id. at 586 (“In the 
context of arts funding, in contrast to many other subsidies, the Government does not indiscrimi-
nately ‘encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.’ The NEA’s mandate is to make es-
thetic judgments, and the inherently content-based ‘excellence’ threshold for NEA support sets it 
apart from the subsidy at issue in Rosenberger . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
 32. 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
 33. Id. at 541 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833) (citation omitted). 
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by the attorney to the courts cannot be classified as governmental 
speech even under a generous understanding of the concept. In this 
vital respect this suit is distinguishable from Rust.34 
Firmly rooting the origins of the Court’s government speech doc-
trine in Rust, these later decisions also cast additional light on what is, 
and is not, government speech. The Court suggested in dicta, for exam-
ple, that a public university’s curricular decisions and faculty speech 
constitute government’s own expression,35 as does military recruiters’ 
speech36 and the speech of a lawyer who represents the government.37  
B. A Simple Question Remains Unanswered 
The Court next characterized contested expression as “government 
speech” in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association,38 where it con-
sidered a First Amendment challenge to a generic beef promotion cam-
paign implemented by the Department of Agriculture and funded by 
taxes targeted at beef producers.39 A number of beef producers objected 
to the government’s requirement that they fund the program because they 
felt that the campaign undermined their efforts to promote their own spe-
cialty beef products.40 The ads bore only the attribution, “Funded by 
America’s Beef Producers,”41 generating a dispute over whether reason-
able onlookers would understand the speech as the government’s.42 
  
 34. Id. at 542–43.  
 35. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235 (“In the instant case, the speech is not that of the Univer-
sity or its agents. It is not, furthermore, speech by an instructor or a professor in the academic con-
text, where principles applicable to government speech would have to be considered.”).  
 36. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61 n. 4 
(2006) (“The military recruiters' speech is clearly Government speech.”). 
 37. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542 (“The attorney defending the decision to deny benefits 
will deliver the government’s message in the litigation. The LSC lawyer, however, speaks on the 
behalf of his or her private, indigent client.”). The Court’s characterization of government editors’ 
and public libraries’ selection decisions has been more opaque, emphasizing such decisions’ expres-
sive character, but falling short of characterizing them as government speech entirely exempt from 
speech clause scrutiny. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998) 
(“When a public broadcaster exercises editorial discretion in the selection and presentation of its 
programming, it engages in speech activity. Although programming decisions often involve the 
compilation of the speech of third parties, the decisions nonetheless constitute communicative acts.”) 
(citations omitted); United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 209 n.4 (2003) (“A library’s 
decision to use filtering software is a collection decision, not a restraint on private speech.”). 
 38. 544 U.S. 550 (2005). 
 39. Id. at 562. 
 40. Id. at 556. 
 41. Id. at 555. 
 42. Compare id. at 566 (“We have only the funding tagline itself, a trademarked term that, 
standing alone, is not sufficiently specific to convince a reasonable factfinder that any particular beef 
producer, or all beef producers, would be tarred with the content of each trademarked ad.”), with id. 
at 577–78 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[R]eaders would most naturally think that ads urging people to 
have beef for dinner were placed and paid for by the beef producers who stand to profit when beef is 
on the table. No one hearing a commercial for Pepsi or Levi’s thinks Uncle Sam is the man talking 
behind the curtain. Why would a person reading a beef ad think Uncle Sam was trying to make him 
eat more steak?”). 
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All of the Justices agreed that private speakers can be compelled to 
pay for government speech with which they disagree, emphasizing that 
an effective government requires that taxpayers frequently fund govern-
ment speech with which they quarrel.43 The majority and dissent differed 
vigorously, however, on the question whether government must identify 
itself as the source of that speech in order successfully to assert the gov-
ernment speech defense to the plaintiffs’ free speech claim. Their dis-
agreement largely turned on their varying assessments of the demands of 
meaningful political accountability. 
The Johanns majority found that government had no affirmative 
duty to make clear its role as the message’s source as a condition of 
claiming the government speech defense. Instead, it highlighted two fac-
tors as key to its characterization of the advertisements as government 
speech exempt from free speech clause scrutiny: whether the government 
established the overall message to be communicated, and whether the 
government approved, and thus controlled, the message ultimately dis-
seminated.44 It thus found the promotional campaign to be government 
speech based simply on the government’s formal authorization and con-
trol of the message at the time of its creation: 
[T]he beef advertisements are subject to political safeguards more 
than adequate to set them apart from private messages. The program 
is authorized and the basic message prescribed by federal statute, and 
specific requirements for the promotions’ content are imposed by 
federal regulations promulgated after notice and comment. The Sec-
retary of Agriculture, a politically accountable official, oversees the 
program, appoints and dismisses the key personnel, and retains abso-
lute veto power over the advertisements’ content, right down to the 
wording. And Congress, of course, retains oversight authority, not to 
mention the ability to reform the program at any time. No more is re-
quired.45 
In contrast, dissenting Justice Souter would have required the gov-
ernment affirmatively to disclose its authorship to ensure that political 
accountability remains a meaningful check on the government’s com-
pelled subsidies of such speech: 
It means nothing that Government officials control the message if 
that fact is never required to be made apparent to those who get the 
message, let alone if it is affirmatively concealed from them. The po-
  
 43. See id. at 562 (majority opinion); id. at 574 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The first point of 
certainty is the need to recognize the legitimacy of government’s power to speak despite objections 
by dissenters whose taxes or other exactions necessarily go in some measure to putting the offensive 
message forward to be heard. To govern, government has to say something, and a First Amendment 
heckler’s veto of any forced contribution to raising the government’s voice in the ‘marketplace of 
ideas’ would be out of the question.”). 
 44. Id. at 562 (majority opinion). 
 45. Id. at 563–64. 
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litical accountability of the officials with control is insufficient, in 
other words, just because those officials are allowed to use their con-
trol (and in fact are deliberately using it) to conceal their role from 
the voters with the power to hold them accountable. Unless the puta-
tive government speech appears to be coming from the government, 
its governmental origin cannot possibly justify the burden on the 
First Amendment interests of the dissenters targeted to pay for it.46  
Indeed, nowhere did the Johanns majority respond to Justice 
Souter’s simple and key question: why not require government to iden-
tify itself as the message’s source—especially because labeling the fa-
miliar “Beef, It’s What’s for Dinner” ads as “A Message of the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture” rather than with the misleading “Funded by 
America’s Beef Producers” demands very little from the government as a 
practical matter while providing considerable value in ensuring political 
accountability. As Justice Souter stated: 
Notably, the Court nowhere addresses how, or even whether, the 
benefits of allowing government to mislead taxpayers by concealing 
its sponsorship of expression outweigh the additional imposition on 
First Amendment rights that results from it. Indeed, the Court de-
scribes no benefits from its approach and gives no reason to think 
First Amendment doctrine should accommodate the Government’s 
subterfuge.47  
This remains the great unanswered question in the Court’s govern-
ment speech doctrine. This doctrine recognizes the inevitability of gov-
ernment speech: government must express itself to govern effectively. 
Such government expression, moreover, serves valuable First Amend-
ment interests in enabling members of the public to identify and assess 
their governments’ priorities and thus inform their participation in self-
governance. But because government has no individual autonomy inter-
est in self-expression,48 government’s expressive interests do not include 
an interest in speaking without identifying itself as the speaker. If a mes-
sage’s governmental source is obscured, moreover, political accountabil-
ity mechanisms provide no meaningful safeguard. 
Recall that the majority in Rust displayed a similar disinterest in re-
quiring government to reveal itself as the speaker as a condition of claim-
  
 46. Id. at 578–79 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
 47. Id. at 579 n.8; see also id. (“The Court merely observes that no precedent requires the 
Government to show its hand when it seeks to defend a targeted assessment by claiming government 
speech. That is of course to be expected, since the government-speech doctrine is so new . . . .”) 
(citation omitted).  
 48. See Randall P. Bezanson, The Manner of Government Speech, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 809, 
816 (2010) (“[G]overnment is a speaker that enjoys no individual liberty or free will, and whose 
need to express itself is limited by a different constitutional role and duty.”). In contrast, the Court 
has recognized the First Amendment value of anonymous speech by private actors. See, e.g., McIn-
tyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 336, 357 (1995) (striking down state ban on the 
distribution of unsigned political leaflets). 
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ing the government speech defense, as the contested regulations there did 
not insist on the disclosure of the expression’s governmental origins.49 
Instead, the doctors, nurses, and other clinic employees who provided the 
counseling were advised to respond to abortion-related requests simply 
by stating that “the project does not consider abortion an appropriate 
method of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer for 
abortion.”50 Because patients may view health professionals as more 
credible than the government on these matters, some may have been mis-
led into evaluating the counseling differently than they would have if the 
speakers had made clear its governmental source.51  
As in Johanns, the Rust majority also displayed a reluctance to con-
clude that listeners will mistakenly attribute what is actually the govern-
ment’s own speech to a private party, noting only that nothing in the 
regulations “require[d] a doctor to represent as his own any opinion that 
he does not in fact hold. . . . [A] doctor’s silence with regard to abortion 
cannot reasonably be thought to mislead a client into thinking that the 
doctor does not consider abortion an appropriate option for her.”52 Re-
sisting any requirement that the government affirmatively identify itself 
as the source of contested expression as a condition of claiming the gov-
ernment speech defense, the Court in Rust thus started down a troubling 
path that it continues to follow to this day.  
C. A Doctrine Increasingly Untethered From Its Theoretical Founda-
tions 
The Court compounded this flaw in Garcetti v. Ceballos,53 where it 
dramatically expanded government’s ability to claim speech as its own. 
There the Court considered a First Amendment challenge by a prosecutor 
disciplined for his internal memorandum that criticized a police depart-
ment affidavit as including serious misrepresentations.54 Citing earlier 
cases in which it had distinguished government’s own speech from that 
of private parties, the Court held that “[r]estricting speech that owes its 
existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not 
infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citi-
zen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the 
  
 49. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 180 (1991) (explaining that employees of clinics receiving 
federal funding were “expressly prohibited from referring a pregnant woman to an abortion provider, 
even upon specific request.”).  
 50. Id. (citation omitted). Although the regulations did not require that the government be 
identified as the message’s source, the majority observed that “[n]othing in [the Title X regulations] 
requires a doctor to represent as his own any opinion that he does not in fact hold.” Id. at 200. 
 51. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government 
Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1394–96 (2001) (arguing that patients could mistakenly attribute the 
government’s views to their doctors); Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 174 
(1996) (same).  
 52. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 200. 
 53. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 54. Id. at 413–14. 
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employer itself has commissioned or created.”55 The Court thus created a 
bright-line rule that essentially treats public employees’ speech delivered 
pursuant to their official duties as the government’s own speech that it 
has bought with a salary and thus may control free from First Amend-
ment scrutiny.56 Justice Souter’s dissent, in contrast, resisted the major-
ity’s bright-line rule as “portend[ing] a bloated notion of controllable 
government speech.”57  
As discussed extensively elsewhere,58 Garcetti empowers the gov-
ernment to punish public employees simply for doing their jobs when 
those workers have been hired to flag hazards and improprieties. For this 
reason, Garcetti has had the most real-world impact of the Court’s gov-
ernment speech decisions to date, as lower courts now routinely rely on it 
to dispose of the constitutional claims of government workers fired after 
making job-required reports of illegal or dangerous conditions despite 
the great value of such speech to the public.59 The outcomes in these 
cases now turn not on the public’s interest in the expression, nor on any 
injury to the government employer, but instead simply on whether the 
contested speech falls within the plaintiff’s job duties.  
Consider, as just one example, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hup-
pert v. City of Pittsburg.60 The court there applied Garcetti to hold that 
the First Amendment does not protect police officers from punishment 
based on their truthful testimony before a grand jury investigating possi-
ble police department corruption because such testimony occurs pursuant 
to their official duties and is thus subject to their government employer’s 
control.61 
  
 55. Id. at 421–22 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 
(1995) (“[W]hen the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own 
it is entitled to say what it wishes.”)). 
 56. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22. The Garcetti majority left open the possibility that 
public educators’ speech that raises issues of academic freedom might be subject to a different 
standard. Id. at 425 (“We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we con-
duct today would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or 
teaching.”). 
 57. Id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 58. Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Work-
ers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1 (2009) (arguing that the First Amend-
ment should be understood to permit government to claim as its own—and thus control as govern-
ment speech free from First Amendment scrutiny—only the speech of public employees that it has 
specifically hired to deliver a particular viewpoint that is transparently governmental in origin and 
thus open to the public’s meaningful credibility and accountability check). 
 59. See id. at 14–15 (canvassing examples).  
 60. 574 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 61. Id. at 708–09. The circuits are currently split on this issue. The Third Circuit held that the 
First Amendment still protects police officers’ truthful testimony even after Garcetti on the grounds 
that such testimony is their duty as citizens as well as police officers. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 
532 F.3d 216, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he act of offering truthful testimony is the responsibility of 
every citizen, and the First Amendment protection associated with fulfilling that duty of citizenship 
is not vitiated by one's status as a public employee.”).  
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The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Fairley v. Andrews62 further dem-
onstrates the point. There the plaintiff prison guards alleged that they had 
suffered threats and assaults because of their reports that other guards 
regularly beat prisoners without justification.63 After Garcetti, Judge 
Easterbrook concluded, the First Amendment offers the plaintiffs no pro-
tection because their jobs required them to flag prisoner maltreatment: 
“Since the General Orders require guards to report misconduct by their 
colleagues, the guards’ reports are not part of the freedom of speech—
and how the sheriff responds is a question for statutes, regulations, and 
wise management rather than the Constitution.”64 Just as unsuccessful 
were the plaintiffs’ efforts to escape Garcetti by arguing that their jobs 
actually—although unofficially—required a code of silence, which they 
broke with their reports of misconduct: 
Garcetti applies to job requirements that limit, as well as those that 
require, speech. Suppose the Jail put a guard in charge of maintaining 
a bulletin board, instructing him to post only materials that relate to 
workplace safety. If the guard puts up something on a different topic, 
or fails to put up anything, the management may discipline the guard 
without encountering an objection under the first amendment. . . . 
And Garcetti can’t be limited to ‘good’ workplace requirements . . . . 
The purported code of silence is a ban on filing complaints about 
guard-on-inmate violence. Such a policy might be foolish; it might 
expose the County to other lawsuits; but it does not offend the first 
amendment . . . .65  
In short, Garcetti operates to the detriment of public employees who 
challenge government corruption or otherwise speak out on matters of 
significant public interest. It thus illustrates the absurd results generated 
by the Court’s doctrine—a doctrine now increasingly unmoored from its 
theoretical underpinnings, as it fails to recognize the constitutional value 
of government speech as rooted entirely in its ability to enhance, rather 
than frustrate, government’s accountability to its electorate.  
D. Finally, An Easy Government Speech Case—But Questions Remain 
This brings us to Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,66 the first case in 
which the Court was unanimous in characterizing contested speech as the 
government’s. The City of Pleasant Grove’s Pioneer Park contained “15 
permanent displays, at least 11 of which were donated by private” parties 
and which included “an historic granary, a wishing well, the City’s first 
fire station, a September 11 monument, and a Ten Commandments 
  
 62. 578 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 63. Id. at 520–21. 
 64. Id. at 522. 
 65. Id. at 523 (citations omitted). 
 66. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).  
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monument donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles in 1971.”67 Sum-
mum, a religious organization, requested permission to donate and erect 
a stone monument in the park similar in size to the Ten Commandments 
monument but instead featuring the Seven Aphorisms of Summum (a 
series of statements that Summum adherents believe that God gave to 
Moses).68 The City denied the request, claiming that it had made the ex-
pressive choice to accept only monuments that either directly related to 
the town’s history or were donated by groups with longstanding ties to 
the community.69 The plaintiffs asserted that the various park monuments 
instead represented the expression of the private speakers who donated 
them.70 Government and private parties thus both lay expressive claim to 
the same speech. When the City denied its request, Summum sued, alleg-
ing that the City’s rejection of its monument violated the U.S. Constitu-
tion’s free speech clause.71  
A unanimous Court found this easily characterized as government 
speech: “There may be situations in which it is difficult to tell whether a 
government entity is speaking on its own behalf or is providing a forum 
for private speech, but this case does not present such a situation. Perma-
nent monuments displayed on public property typically represent gov-
ernment speech.”72 Although the Justices continued to divide over 
whether government must affirmatively identify itself as a message’s 
source to claim the government speech defense, all agreed that the ex-
pression at issue satisfied their various tests for government speech. 
Justice Alito’s majority opinion, for example, relied on a number of 
rationales in characterizing the contested speech as the government’s. At 
times, he focused on the Johanns “establishment and control” factors:  
[T]he City has ‘effectively controlled’ the messages sent by the 
monuments in the Park by exercising ‘final approval authority’ over 
  
 67. Id. at 1129. 
 68. Id. at 1129–30.  
 69. Id. at 1130. 
 70. See id. at 1131. 
 71. Id. Summum also alleged that the City violated the Free Speech and Establishment 
Clauses of the Utah Constitution. Complaint ¶¶ 31–39, Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, No. 
2:05CV00638 DB, 2005 WL 2918243, (D. Utah July 29, 2005). However, neither of these claims 
were raised on appeal. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1048 n.3 (10th Cir. 2007). 
Although the plaintiff had a number of strategic motivations, this decision can be explained in large 
part by the fact that prevailing on an establishment clause claim would result in the removal of the 
Ten Commandments monument, rather than requiring the inclusion of Summum’s monument. See 
Bernadette Meyler, Summum and the Establishment Clause, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 95, 95 
(2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/32/LRColl2009n32Meyler.pdf; 
Nelson Tebbe, Privatizing and Publicizing Speech, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 70, 73 (2009), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/30/LRColl2009n30Tebbe.pdf.  
Although the Court thus considered only the free speech clause claim, the potential establishment 
clause issues proved distracting to many. Indeed, Justice Scalia concurred separately to emphasize 
his view that the city’s display of the Ten Commandments did not violate the Establishment Clause. 
Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139–40 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 72. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132. 
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their selection. The City has selected those monuments that it wants 
to display for the purpose of presenting the image of the City that it 
wishes to project to all who frequent the Park; it has taken ownership 
of most of the monuments in the Park, including the Ten Command-
ments monument that is the focus of respondent's concern; and the 
City has now expressly set forth the criteria it will use in making fu-
ture selections.73 
The majority, however, also noted that observers would likely at-
tribute the expression to the city,74 thus satisfying the test preferred by a 
number of the concurring justices.75 More specifically, the majority noted 
that historical context,76 longstanding government practice,77 and the 
monuments’ location on the city’s own property78 served as cues79 that 
signaled the expression’s governmental source to onlookers.80 In so do-
ing, however, the majority again failed to tie its rationale to any discus-
sion of the value of government speech in informing the public about its 
  
 73. Id. at 1134 (quoting Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Assn., 544 U.S. 550, 560–61 (2005)) 
(citation omitted). 
 74. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134 (“[T]he City took ownership of that monument and put it on 
permanent display in a park that it owns and manages and that is linked to the City's identity. All 
rights previously possessed by the monument's donor have been relinquished. The City's actions 
provided a more dramatic form of adoption than the sort of formal endorsement that respondent 
would demand, unmistakably signifying to all Park visitors that the City intends the monument to 
speak on its behalf.”). 
 75. See id. at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[T]he best approach that occurs to me is to ask 
whether a reasonable and fully informed observer would understand the expression to be govern-
ment speech, as distinct from private speech the government chooses to oblige by allowing the 
monument to be placed on public land.”). 
 76. See id. at 1132–33 (majority opinion) (“Governments have long used monuments to speak 
to the public. Since ancient times, kings, emperors, and other rulers have erected statues of them-
selves to remind their subjects of their authority and power. Triumphal arches, columns, and other 
monuments have been built to commemorate military victories and sacrifices and other events of 
civic importance.”). 
 77. See id. at 1133 (“We think it is fair to say that throughout our Nation's history, the general 
government practice with respect to donated monuments has been one of selective receptivity.”). 
 78. See id. (“Just as government-commissioned and government-financed monuments speak 
for the government, so do privately financed and donated monuments that the government accepts 
and displays to the public on government land. It certainly is not common for property owners to 
open up their property for the installation of permanent monuments that convey a message with 
which they do not wish to be associated. And because property owners typically do not permit the 
construction of such monuments on their land, persons who observe donated monuments routinely—
and reasonably—interpret them as conveying some message on the property owner's behalf. In this 
context, there is little chance that observers will fail to appreciate the identity of the speaker.”). 
 79. See Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 
88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 607–09 (2008) (describing how onlookers use a variety of “source cues” to 
determine a message’s origins). 
 80. Although concurring Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer made clear their 
resistance to a bright-line rule that public monuments always constitute government speech, they 
agreed that, under these particular circumstances, reasonable observers would understand the 
monuments to reflect the city’s own expression. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139 (Stevens, J., con-
curring) (“Nor is it likely, given the near certainty that observers will associate permanent displays 
with the governmental property owner, that the government will be able to avoid political account-
ability for the views that it endorses or expresses through this means.”); id. at 1141 (Souter, J., 
concurring) (“And although the government should lose when the character of the speech is at issue 
and its governmental nature has not been made clear, I also agree with the Court that the city need 
not satisfy the particular formality urged by Summum . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
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government in a way that enhances political accountability, even as it 
acknowledged—but declined to address—the “legitimate concern that 
the government speech doctrine not be used as a subterfuge for favoring 
certain private speakers over others based on viewpoint.”81  
Perhaps Summum was unanimous because the objectionable conse-
quences of a contrary ruling were so clear as a pragmatic matter.82 New 
York City, as just one example, would otherwise face a choice of declin-
ing France’s offer of the Statue of Liberty or instead accepting it so long 
as it accepted all other offers of statues of a similar size and nature.83 To 
be sure, pragmatism often drives the Court’s First Amendment doc-
trine.84 It has done so very inconsistently, however, in the government 
speech context. For example, the Johanns majority’s refusal to require 
the disclosure of expression’s governmental origins as a condition of 
claiming the defense makes no pragmatic sense, in that such transpar-
ency demands very little from the government as a practical matter while 
providing considerable value in ensuring meaningful political account-
ability. And although the Garcetti decision is fueled by pragmatic con-
  
 81. Id. at 1134 (majority opinion); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Moving to the Right, Perhaps 
Sharply to the Right, 12 GREEN BAG 2d 413, 426–27 (2009) (expressing concern that Summum will 
permit governments to adopt demonstrations as their own on the basis of viewpoint and thus engage 
in “blatantly unconstitutional form[s] of viewpoint discrimination. . . . Perhaps a distinction could be 
drawn between permanent monuments, as in Summum, and transitory speech, such as demonstra-
tions. It is impossible to explain, though, why this is a distinction that would matter under the First 
Amendment.”).  
 82. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134 (“Requiring all of these jurisdictions [that have accepted 
monuments without such formal declarations] to go back and proclaim formally that they adopt all 
of these monuments as their own expressive vehicles would be a pointless exercise that the Constitu-
tion does not mandate.”); id. at 1138 (describing how government entities required to maintain 
viewpoint neutrality in their selection of donated monuments must either “‘brace themselves for an 
influx of clutter’ or face the pressure to remove longstanding and cherished monuments”) (citation 
omitted). 
 83. See id. at 1137–38. For a powerful example of the pragmatic effects of a ruling to the 
contrary, see Mary Jean Dolan, Why Monuments are Government Speech: The Hard Case of Pleas-
ant Grove City v. Summum, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 7, 10 & n.18 (2008) (detailing efforts by opponents 
of gay rights to donate a monument to hate crime victim Matthew Shepard to the city of Laramie, 
proclaiming that Matthew “[e]ntered hell October 12, 1998, in defiance of God’s Warning”). 
 84. See Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 411, 415 (1992) (“Pragmatism further advocates solutions to First Amendment prob-
lems through careful, contextual, pragmatic reasoning.”); Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus 
Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis, 54 STAN. L. REV. 737, 739 (2002) (“[T]he constitutional 
law of free speech seems on the whole, though certainly not in every respect, to be a product of the 
judges’ (mainly they are United States Supreme Court Justices) trying to reach results that are rea-
sonable in light of their consequences.”); Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and 
the Inescapable Pragmatism of the Common Law of Free Speech 10 (Chapman Univ. Sch. of Law 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-36, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1481478## (“[I]n First Amendment jurispru-
dence, pragmatic balancing is inescapable.”). But see Eugene Volokh, Pragmatism v. Ideology in 
Free Speech Cases, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 33, 34 (2004) (discussing “the weakness of the turn from 
principle to pragmatism”); R. George Wright, Pragmatism and Freedom of Speech, 80 N.D. L. REV. 
103, 104 (2004) (stating that pragmatic approaches “ultimately tend to drain the life from our most 
adequate and circumstantially appropriate moral vocabularies and cannot properly account for virtu-
ally all the class free speech values, aims, and purposes”).  
916 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:4 
cerns related to public agency governance,85 it also imposes disastrous 
pragmatic consequences with respect to public access to government 
workers’ reports of corruption and threats to health and safety.86 The 
Court’s government speech doctrine thus seems unmoored not only from 
a principled commitment to the role of government speech in enhancing 
government’s accountability to the public, but also from pragmatic con-
cerns as well. The majority simply appears to defer to the government, as 
it has yet to deny government’s claim to contested speech as its own.87  
Rather than simply acquiesce to government’s claim to speech as its 
own, the Court should instead require a government entity seeking to 
claim the government speech defense to establish that it expressly 
claimed the speech as its own when it authorized the communication and 
that onlookers understood the speech to be the government’s at the time 
of its delivery, thus maximizing the public’s ability to engage in mean-
ingful political accountability measures as well as in undeceived assess-
ments of the message’s credibility.88 This is a relatively easy problem to 
solve, both doctrinally and technologically, should the Court have the 
will to do so. The next Subpart explores the possibility that emerging 
government speech challenges will place additional pressure on the 
Court to reconsider and perhaps refine its approach to government 
speech disputes.  
E. What’s Next: Increasing Pressure for Doctrinal Change 
Because the Supreme Court has yet to articulate a clear rule for 
parsing government from private speech—much less one that insists on 
meaningful political accountability to check the government’s expressive 
choices—lower courts continue to indicate frustration with the Court’s 
doctrine in this area. Indeed, a number of circuit courts of appeal have 
declined to take the easy bait offered by the Court simply to defer to 
government claims to contested speech as its own. Moreover, they ap-
pear reluctant to embrace the Court’s focus on government’s establish-
  
 85. See Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Preroga-
tive, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 38 (2008). 
 86. See Norton, supra note 58, at 14–15, 30–34. 
 87. In the four decisions characterized to date by the Court as involving competing govern-
mental and private claims to the same speech—Rust, Johanns, Garcetti, and Summum—the Court 
characterized contested speech as the government’s own speech so that government could control its 
content free from First Amendment scrutiny. 
 88. See Norton, supra note 79, at 599; see also id. (“[G]overnment can establish its entitle-
ment to the government speech defense only when it establishes itself as the source of that expres-
sion both as a formal and as a functional matter. In other words, government must expressly claim 
the speech as its own when it authorizes or creates a communication and onlookers must understand 
the message to be the government’s at the time of its delivery.”) (emphasis added). For other com-
mentators’ thoughtful discussion of these and related issues, see, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson & Wil-
liam G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377 (2001); Caroline Mala 
Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605 
(2008); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who’s Talking? Disentangling Government and Private Speech, 36 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 35 (2002); Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 
HASTINGS L.J. 983 (2005). 
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ment and control of contested expression largely because of its troubling 
implications that the more government controls speech, the more speech 
it will be permitted to control—a proposition that seems inimical to First 
Amendment values.89  
For example, several circuit courts continue to apply a four-factor 
test for parsing government from private speech—a test cobbled together 
before the Court’s more recent government speech cases. Under this ap-
proach, courts examine the purpose of the contested program, the degree 
of editorial control exercised by public or private entities, the identity of 
the “literal” speaker, and whether public or private entities bear “ultimate 
responsibility” for the expression.90 Although circuit courts long failed to 
identify the theoretical justification underlying this test,91 they now more 
helpfully explain these factors as proxies for determining a reasonable 
onlooker’s attribution of the speech to the government or private parties, 
and thus for the public’s meaningful ability to hold the government ac-
countable for its expression. 
Consider, more specifically, the ongoing controversy over whether 
certain specialty license plates—such as those featuring the message 
“Choose Life”—reflect the speech of the state (and thus entirely within 
the government’s control) or of the car owners (and thus subject to First 
Amendment protections).92 Such disputes continue to trouble lower 
courts, which increasingly suggest the need for a government speech 
doctrine that attends to government’s meaningful accountability to the 
public for its expressive choices. Indeed, a number of circuit courts 
largely ignore the “establishment and control” factors emphasized by the 
Supreme Court majority in Johanns,93 preferring instead a test that ap-
pears more akin to Justice Souter’s dissent in Johanns and his concurring 
  
 89. See Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 337 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J., dissent-
ing) (“The majority's position has the potential of permitting a governmental entity to engage in 
viewpoint discrimination in its own governmentally-owned channels so long as the governmental 
entity can cast its actions as its own speech after the fact. What is to stop a governmental entity from 
applying the doctrine to a parade? Or official events? It is nearly impossible to concoct examples of 
viewpoint discrimination on government channels that cannot otherwise be repackaged ex post as 
‘government speech.’”) (citations omitted).  
 90. See Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 792–800 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(applying a four-factor test to conclude that specialty license plates were better characterized as 
private, rather than governmental speech; thus, the First Amendment did not permit government to 
exclude messages based on viewpoint); see also Wells v. City and County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 
1141–44 (10th Cir. 2001) (applying a four-factor test to conclude that a specific holiday display on 
public property constituted government speech; thus, Plaintiff had no First Amendment right to add 
to the display). 
 91. See Norton, supra note 79, at 597–99. 
 92. Adam Liptak, Is That Plate Speaking For the Driver Or the State?, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 
2009, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/28/us/28bar.html (“[T]he volume of 
litigation on this question and the doctrinal free-for-all it has given rise to in the lower courts have 
convinced many legal scholars that the court must soon step in.”).  
 93. See Scott W. Gaylord, Licensing Facially Religious Government Speech: Summum’s 
Impact on the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 315 (discussing 
lower courts’ resistance to the Supreme Court’s emphasis on establishment and control in Summum 
and Johanns). 
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opinion in Summum94 that focuses on the perceptions of reasonable on-
lookers. The Seventh Circuit, for example, applied a four-factor test, 
urging that it “be distilled (and simplified) by focusing on the following 
inquiry: Under all the circumstances, would a reasonable person consider 
the speaker to be the government or a private party?”95 The court then 
concluded that onlookers would attribute specialty license plate messages 
to private, rather than public, speakers.96  
More recently, the Eighth Circuit summarily distinguished the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Summum97 and instead emphasized: “Our 
analysis boils down to one key question: whether, under all the circum-
stances, a reasonable and fully informed observer would consider the 
speaker to be the government or a private party.”98 In “concluding that a 
reasonable and fully informed observer would consider the speaker to be 
the organization that sponsors and the vehicle owner who displays the 
specialty license plate,”99 it thus joined the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits in stressing the importance of government’s transparent identifi-
cation of speech as its own to ensure the government’s meaningful po-
litical accountability for its expressive choices.100 Only the Sixth Circuit 
has yet applied the Johanns establishment and control factors to conclude 
that “Choose Life” specialty plates are the government’s own speech 
exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.101  
As the foregoing illustrates, the most difficult government speech 
cases generally involve some forms of collaboration or interaction be-
tween government and private speakers in contexts that create doubt 
about the source of contested expression.102 These controversies will 
  
 94. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1142 (Souter, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he best approach that occurs to me is to ask whether a reasonable and fully informed observer 
would understand the expression to be government speech, as distinct from private speech the gov-
ernment chooses to oblige by allowing the monument to be placed on public land.”). 
 95. Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
59 (2009).  
 96. Id. at 863–64. 
 97. Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 868 n.3 (8th Cir. 2009) (“We deal here with a much 
different issue [than that in Summum]: whether specialty license plates on privately-owned vehicles 
communicate government speech. Unlike monuments displayed in public parks, specialty license 
plates that advertise the name or motto of a private organization facilitate expressive conduct on the 
part of the organization and its supporters, not the government.”).  
 98. Id. at 867. 
 99. Id.  
 100. See White, 547 F.3d at 863; Ariz. Life Coalition Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 964–65 
(9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 56 (2008); Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 
F.3d 786, 795–96 (4th Cir. 2004) (“The government speech doctrine was not intended to authorize 
cloaked advocacy that allows the State to promote an idea without being accountable to the political 
process.”).  
 101. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 380 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. 
denied, 548 U.S. 906 (2006). For a discussion of circumstances under which specialty license plates 
might accurately be characterized as the government’s own speech, see Helen Norton, Shining a 
Light on Democracy’s Dark Lagoon, 61 S. CAR. L. REV. 535, 537–42 (2010). 
 102. Similar disputes involve determinations of whether the government’s decision to accept 
and recognize services from some private entities and not others reflects the government’s own 
expressive act, or whether such discretionary recognition is better understood as viewpoint-based 
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likely increase in number with government’s growing use of Web 2.0 
networked technologies that facilitate interactivity and collaboration at 
speeds and scales heretofore unimagined.103 Emerging challenges involv-
ing government’s use of contemporary expressive technologies may thus 
put additional pressure on the Court to reconsider its resistance to a re-
quirement that the government affirmatively identify itself as the source 
of contested expression as a condition of claiming the government 
speech defense.104 The next Part explores the contexts in which such dis-
putes may arise, and offers suggestions for their resolution. 
PART II: A NEW GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE FOR THE NEW 
GOVERNMENT SPEECH  
A.  A Typology of Emerging Expressive Technologies Used by Govern-
ment. 
In our information age, governmental use of networked technolo-
gies to express its views is as valuable as it is necessary. Today, the effi-
cacy of government expression depends upon government’s use of net-
worked technologies, such as websites, links, social network sites, blogs, 
virtual worlds, video-sharing sites, and other online platforms.105 The 
public spends much of its time online and often expects government to 
interact with it through a variety of social media.106 Through its online 
  
discrimination against private speakers. See, e.g., Michael Cooper, In Missouri, a Free Speech Fight 
Over a Highway Adoption, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2009, at A14, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/21/us/21highway.html (describing controversy over neo-Nazi 
groups’ efforts to adopt a stretch of state highway with recognition in a state adopt-a-highway sign); 
Posting of Robert Mackey & Ashley Southall to The Lede Blog, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2009/03/31/kfc-and-peta-vie-to-fix-potholes/ (March 31, 2009, 4:58 EST) (describing Louisville’s 
willingness to accept pothole paving funded by and featuring advertising of Kentucky Fried Chicken 
but rejecting similar offer by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals). 
 103. As discussed more extensively infra, at least one circuit court judge has resisted the appli-
cation of the Court’s current approach to disputes involving government’s use of networked tech-
nologies. See Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 337–38 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J., 
dissenting) (“What is lacking in this ‘recently minted’ area of the law are any limiting principles. 
The majority extends the discrimination-as-government-speech doctrine to links on a government 
website. . . . [I]n the present case the majority extends the doctrine to a situation where, in my view, 
it was not clear that the government was engaging in speech at the time it was acting, and only 
justified its actions after the fact.”) (citations omitted). 
 104. That the Court has now recognized the great instrumental value of requiring the disclosure 
of a message’s author in the campaign finance context further suggests the possibility that it may be 
open to the possibility of such a requirement in the government speech context as well. See Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010) (“The First Amendment protects politi-
cal speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate 
entities in a proper way. This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and 
give proper weight to different speakers and messages.”). 
 105. For a thoughtful discussion of the value of such speech, see Mary Jean Dolan, The Special 
Public Purpose Forum and Endorsement Relationships: New Extensions of Government Speech, 31 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71, 132–34 (2004). 
 106. Pew Internet & American Life Project recently reported that “37% of social network site 
users expect . . . updates” from the Obama Administration via social network sites and 34% expect 
to hear from the Administration via email. AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE 
PROJECT MEMO, POST-ELECTION VOTER ENGAGEMENT 1 (2008), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/ 
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expression, government provides the public with valuable information 
about government opinions. Not only might members of the public find 
these views helpful in developing their own positions, but they also learn 
much more about their elected officials’ values and priorities. This helps 
inform the public’s views on whether those officials should be re-elected 
or replaced.  
In recognition of this reality, governments increasingly embrace a 
wide variety of networked technologies to communicate with the public. 
These include the static communicative technologies of Web 1.0 as well 
as more interactive platforms characteristic of Web 2.0.107 By mapping 
such technologies’ transparency and interactivity,108 this section offers a 
typology that may be helpful in identifying when government speaks for 
itself and when it instead should be understood as providing a forum for 
others’ speech—determinations that trigger very different First Amend-
ment consequences.  
1. Transparent Non-Interactive Technologies 
Governments use the Internet and related technologies to express 
themselves in a wide range of non-interactive ways. All or parts of most 
governmental websites provide the public with information authored 
solely by the government with no means for the public to contribute 
ideas. Certain government blogs do the same, informing the public about 
policy and recent news without permitting anyone to comment on 
posts.109 Government officials use micro blogging services such as Twit-
ter to provide information to interested readers, who cannot respond di-
rectly to governmental Tweets directly,110 and agencies similarly send 
text messages to interested members of the public.111  
  
media//Files/Reports/2008/PIP_Voter_Engagement_2008.pdf.pdf; see also AARON SMITH, THE 
INTERNET’S ROLE IN CAMPAIGN 2008 (2009), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/ 
2009/The_Internets_Role_in_Campaign_2008.pdf (documenting the public’s avid involvement in 
the 2008 campaign). 
 107. See, e.g., Tim O’Reilly, Web 2.0: A Compact Definition, http://radar.oreilly.com/2005/10/ 
web-20-compact-definition.html (Oct. 1, 2005) (“Web 2.0 is the network as platform, spanning all 
connected devices; Web 2.0 applications are those that make the most of the intrinsic advantages of 
that platform: delivering software as a continually-updated service that gets better the more people 
use it, consuming and remixing data from multiple sources, including individual users, while provid-
ing their own data and services in a form that allows remixing by others, creating network effects 
through an ‘architecture of participation,’ and going beyond the page metaphor of Web 1.0 to deliver 
rich use experiences.”).  
 108. As Timothy Wu observes, Internet “applications can and do vary dramatically. To the 
user, the Internet comes in many incarnations—email, the World Wide Web, ICQ, and more. A 
singular model of Internet usage has become too small to capture the dramatic diversity of today’s 
Internet.” Wu, supra note 19, at 1163. 
 109. Steve Towns, Four Questions for Beth Noveck, GOVERNMENT TECHNOLOGY, July 2009, 
at 12, available at http://digitalmag.govtech.com/GT/GT_Mag_Jul09.pdf. 
 110. Interview by Scott Simon with Justin Cohen, U.S. State Dep’t (Oct. 17, 2009) (transcript 
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=113876776). Twitter 
“[u]sers . . . can create . . . account[s] to send messages of up to 140 characters to other Twitter 
subscribers.” Helle C. Dale, Public Diplomacy 2.0: Where the U.S. Government Meets “New Me-
dia,” BACKGROUNDER (The Heritage Found.), Dec. 8, 2009, at 9. “Tweets are usually received as 
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Consider some examples. The Department of Homeland Security’s 
(DHS) website provides the public with a plethora of information about 
its work and policies.112 It provides hyperlinks113 to other websites and 
allows readers to subscribe to its news feeds and receive emails concern-
ing updates to the site.114 It does not, however, permit the public to com-
ment on posted stories or to interact with DHS officials online. The web-
site features the DHS’s views only. 
The White House website similarly publishes a dizzying array of in-
formation, from the membership of Federal advisory committees to the 
names of everyone who visits the White House offices.115 It hosts live 
webcasts of the President’s speeches.116 It sponsors eight blogs, including 
the Open Government Blog, the Office of Public Engagement Blog, and 
the White House Blog.117 While the blogs update the public on news, 
policy discussions, and other matters, nearly all omit a comment func-
tion.118 The website thus does not permit public interaction, and the on-
line messages are clearly the White House’s alone.  
Such non-interactive Web 1.0 technologies—which constitute the 
majority of online government speech—permit readers to identify a mes-
sage’s governmental source. Governmental websites and blogs use the 
“.gov” top-level domain name, which is available only to governmental 
entities and thus makes clear the government’s authorship of the online 
expression.119 When governments use micro-blogging services such as 
Twitter, they use “verified” accounts, which authenticate that they ema-
nate from government.120 Such technologies’ transparency is enhanced 
  
text messages on cell phones, often directing followers to lengthier content viewable on the sender’s 
Twitter Web page.” Id. 
 111. See Dale, supra note 110, at 4 (explaining that State Department sent out text messages of 
President Obama’s speech in Cairo to U.S. and non-U.S. citizens); id. at 9 (“The Food and Drug 
Administration, for instance, issues food recalls via Twitter.”). 
 112. See Department of Homeland Security, About the Department, http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xabout/index.shtm (last visited June 1, 2010). 
 113. A hyperlink is a “reference to a document that the reader can directly follow” via the 
World Wide Web. Wikipedia, Hyperlink, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperlink (last visited June 1, 
2010). 
 114. Department of Homeland Security, Preparedness, Response & Recovery, 
http://www.dhs.gov/files/prepresprecovery.shtm (last visited June 1, 2010). 
 115. The White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov (last visited June 1, 2010). 
 116. Dale, supra note 110, at 4. 
 117. See, e.g., The White House Blog, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog (last visited June 1, 
2010). 
 118. The White House-sponsored Office of Science and Technology policy has a blog that has 
comments, thus falling in the moderately interactive/highly transparent category. 
 119. Wikipedia, .gov, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.gov (last visited June 1, 2010) (explaining 
that the domain name “[.]gov is a sponsored top-level domain (sTLD) in the Domain Name System 
of the Internet. The name is derived from government, indicating its restricted use by government 
entities in the United States”). The General Services Administration (GSA), an independent agency 
of the United States federal government, administers the .gov domain name. Id. 
 120. For instance, Governor Schwarzenegger’s Twitter account includes his picture and ex-
plains that it is a verified account, which links to the Governor’s official .gov website. Gov. 
Schwarzenegger (Schwarzenegger) on Twitter, 
http://twitter.com/Schwarzenegger?utm_medium=email& 
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both because they offer the technical means for clearly identifying the 
message’s governmental source and because their non-interactive nature 
avoids the complications in identifying expression’s source often created 
when multiple speakers participate. 
2. Transparent Interactive Technologies 
Governments also employ various Web 2.0 platforms that allow the 
public to interact with them. Government officials and agencies use mi-
cro blogging services that permit government users to send messages to 
subscribers while allowing subscribers to respond to government users’ 
posts. Government officials and agencies also interact with the public 
through social network sites,121 exchanging information through wall 
postings, photographs, videos, and the like.122 They host blogs that per-
mit the public to post comments.123 They sponsor channels on video-
sharing sites such as YouTube where they post videos and invite sub-
scribers to comment on those videos and post their own content. They 
use virtual worlds like Second Life to interact with the public.124  
Although these platforms are interactive, they facilitate transpar-
ency in two important ways: they identify the government as the speaker, 
and, at the same time, they verify the identities of government speakers  
First, the various sites’ architecture clearly signals that expression 
has been authored by the government. A social network profile, for in-
stance, appears like a virtual office (or home), where one can click vari-
ous pages to gain access to a governmental subscriber’s photographs, 
wall postings, videos, and the like. When perusing a government 
agency’s Facebook Fan Page,125 one can view the agency’s videos, join 
live chats with a government official, and see links to websites that the 
  
utm_source=follow&utm_campaign=twitter20080331162631 (last visited June 1, 2010). This is not 
to suggest that Twitter accounts can never be spoofed, but instead that the public can have some 
assurance that the government is indeed speaking. 
 121. Dale, supra note 110, at 7 (explaining that the top five government Facebook pages fre-
quented by the public are The White House, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Army, U.S. Centers for Dis-
ease Control, and the State Department). 
 122. Citron, supra note 11, at 6. 
 123. As defined by Wikipedia: 
A blog . . . is a type of website or part of a website. Blogs are usually maintained by an 
individual with regular entries of commentary, descriptions of events, or other material 
such as graphics or video. Entries are commonly displayed in reverse-chronological or-
der. . . . The ability of readers to leave comments in an interactive format is an important 
part of many blogs. 
Wikipedia, Blog, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blog (last visited June 1, 2010).  
 124. U.S. Department of Commerce, Earth System Research Laboratory, Outreach at ESRL, 
http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/outreach/ (last visited June 1, 2010) (explaining that National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration officials interact with the public on a virtual island in Second Life). 
 125. Facebook permits government officials, agencies, and corporations to set up fan sites, 
which permit “fans” to see the content on a government speaker’s page but prevents government 
subscribers from seeing its fans’ profiles. In contrast, other social network sites, such as MySpace, 
allow government users to generate “friends,” which permits them to see everything included on a 
friend’s profile. Although this capacity has profound implications for privacy, it does not affect the 
government speech issues that we address here. See Citron, supra note 11, at 5–7. 
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agency endorses. If government fans or friends post comments, videos, 
or photographs, fans’ or friends’ names and icon-sized images126 appear 
alongside their messages.127 Given the design of such social network 
sites, blogs, and video-sharing sites, readers can easily identify the gov-
ernment as the author of its wall musings, videos, posts, photographs, 
and links.  
Second, these platforms either purport to verify or actually do 
authenticate the identity of government speakers.128 Third-party plat-
forms build identity verification into their design for sites used by gov-
ernment actors. For instance, a government actor’s Twitter account ex-
plicitly notes that the governmental author of the micro blogging site had 
been “verified,” providing links to the government party’s official web-
site (i.e., one with a .gov domain name). Facebook explains that when 
organizations, such as government agencies, create “Fan Pages,” they do 
so as official representatives of the organization.129 Although third-party 
platforms like Twitter and Facebook do not necessarily check to see 
whether those setting up the accounts actually hail from government, 
they at least signal to the public that those creating the sites hold them-
selves out as government speakers. Moreover, government blogs actually 
verify their governmental character by using a .gov domain name. In 
either case, readers can identify the speakers as governmental.130  
Consider these examples. The White House’s Facebook Fan Page 
permits “two-way interaction between the government and its citizens” 
through online comments, live chats, and message threads.131 It asks 
fans: “Watch & Discuss through Facebook at 1:30: Obama Awards Na-
tional Medals of Science and National Medals of Technology and Inno-
  
 126. In using the term “name” here, we refer to the name or identity provided by the person 
writing the comment. The name may reflect their true identity or may be a pseudonym.  
 127. Similarly, government agencies using video-sharing sites, such as YouTube, employ 
channels that make clear that the videos have been posted by the government agency as host. Much 
like Facebook and MySpace, a government user’s video channel is its virtual room with videos 
posted under its profile. If subscribers comment on the government user’s videos or post videos of 
their own, their name and image appear alongside those expressions. To be sure, the identity of those 
subscribers typically cannot be verified as many write anonymously or under pseudonyms. But 
discussion of the potential need for and value of verifying the identity of subscribers is beyond the 
scope of this Article, which focuses on whether the governmental host’s identity is clear and verifi-
able, and that appears to be the case. 
 128. We use the term “verify” to mean that the social network user, blogger, or video-sharing 
site holds itself out as governmental in ways that third party services suggest is true. We, of course, 
acknowledge that an impersonator could set up a video-sharing site or social network site in the 
government’s name. Our discussion focuses on government’s actual use of Web 2.0 platforms and 
its significance for free speech doctrine and theory. We leave the broader concerns about impersona-
tion for another day.  
 129. Facebook, Create a Page, http://www.facebook.com/pages/create.php (last visited June 1, 
2010). Fan Pages created on behalf of government agencies list their “Type” of Fan Page as “Gov-
ernmental” or “Politician.” 
 130. This is not necessarily true of a blog’s commentators or a social network site’s friends, 
whose identities have not been authenticated in some manner. 
 131. Posting of Saul Hansell to Bits Blog, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/05/the-
nations-new-chief-information-officer-speaks/ (Mar. 5, 2009, 2:57 PM). 
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vation.”132 It has twenty-seven videos of official White House business 
on its Video page; its eight photo albums permit fans to peruse pictures 
of the President and his family.133 When fans comment on postings, post 
videos, or engage in live chats, their Facebook pictures appear next to 
their communications. Facebook provides visual cues as to the identity of 
speakers, helping readers distinguish between the White House’s post-
ings and those of its fans. Furthermore, the White House’s Fan Page veri-
fies its governmental nature. It states: “This is the White House page on 
Facebook. Comments posted on and messages received through White 
House pages are subject to the Presidential Records Act and may be 
archived. Learn more at WhiteHouse.gov/privacy.”134 
The Transportation Safety Administration (TSA) maintains a blog 
called The TSA Blog.135 Five TSA employees run the site, posting on 
various issues related to air safety. They post under their blogging 
names, making clear that their posts reflect TSA-sanctioned ideas. The 
TSA Blog has a page introducing its bloggers and the names under which 
they write.136 The official who runs the site writes his posts under the 
following byline: “Blogger Bob, TSA Blog Team.”137 The tag “TSA 
Blog Team” follows the postings of the rest of the TSA bloggers.138 
When the TSA Blog features guest bloggers, their names and designation 
as “Guest TSA Blogger” appear underneath their posts.139 When indi-
viduals comment on a TSA blogger’s posts, their names (real or imag-
ined) sit alongside their comments.140 Given these design features, the 
  
 132. Facebook, The White House, http://www.facebook.com/WhiteHouse (Oct. 7, 2009, 11:19 
EST). 
 133. Facebook, The White House, The White House’s Videos, http://www.facebook.com/ 
WhiteHouse#!/WhiteHouse?v=app_2392950137 (last visited June 1, 2010); see also Facebook, The 
White House, The White House’s Albums, http://www.facebook.com/WhiteHouse#!/WhiteHouse 
?v=photos (last visited June 1, 2010). 
 134. Facebook, The White House, http://www.facebook.com/WhiteHouse (last visited June 1, 
2010). 
 135. The TSA Blog, http://blog.tsa.gov (last visited June 1, 2010). 
 136. The TSA Blog, Meet Our Bloggers, http://blog.tsa.gov/2008/01/meet-our-
bloggers_29.html (Jan. 30, 2008). 
 137. See, e.g., Posting of Blogger Bob to the TSA Blog, http://blog.tsa.gov/2010/02/four-year-
old-boy-in-philly-told-to.html (Feb. 22, 2010). 
 138. See, e.g., The TSA Blog, Meet Our Bloggers, http://blog.tsa.gov/2008/01/meet-our-
bloggers_29.html (Jan. 30, 2008). 
 139. See, e.g., Posting of John Daly to The TSA Blog, http://blog.tsa.gov/2010/02/tsa-haiti-
evacuation-effort-federal.html (Feb. 4, 2010).  
 140. The TSA Blog moderates comments under the following policy:  
The purpose of this blog is to facilitate an ongoing dialogue on innovations in security, 
technology and the checkpoint screening process. We encourage your comments; your 
ideas and concerns are important to ensure that a broad range of travelers are active and 
informed participants in the discussion. TSA reserves the right to modify this policy at 
any time. This is a moderated blog. That means all comments will be reviewed before 
posting. In addition, we expect that participants will treat each other, as well as our 
agency and our employees, with respect. We will not post comments that contain vulgar 
or abusive language; personal attacks of any kind; or offensive terms that target specific 
ethnic or racial groups. We will not post comments that are spam, are clearly "off topic" 
or that promote services or products. Comments that make unsupported accusations will 
also not be posted. 
 
2010] GOVERNMENT SPEECH 2.0 925 
blog provides clear signals about the identities of governmental 
authors.141 And because only official TSA bloggers are identified as such 
on the website, readers can easily differentiate between official posts and 
unsanctioned comments from private individuals. Much like governmen-
tal social network sites, the TSA Blog remains transparent about the gov-
ernmental source of its expression despite its interactivity. 
3. Opaque Interactive Technologies 
Governments also increasingly use interactive platforms where gov-
ernment speakers’ identities may be both difficult to discern and to 
authenticate. Web 2.0 platforms, such as wikis, permit users to develop 
content collectively and often anonymously. As Wikipedia explains of its 
efforts: “Anyone with internet access can write and make changes to 
Wikipedia articles . . . . Users can contribute anonymously, under a 
pseudonym, or with their real identity . . . .”142 Wikis routinely refuse to 
verify the identity of contributors. Indeed, Wikipedia explicitly discour-
ages contributors from using their real names “for safety reasons.”143 
Wikis do, however, record a history of edits and contributions by 
authors, even though those authors’ identities are not verified.144 Gov-
ernments’ use of interactive technologies built along this model would 
not reliably indicate to readers whether and when speech emanates from 
government participants. 
Consider some examples of government’s use of opaque interactive 
technologies. At the 2007 National Environmental Information Sympo-
sium, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) unveiled a wiki de-
voted to pooling collective knowledge on issues related to the Puget 
Sound, such as “Puget Sound species and the web of life,” the “quality of 
human life sustained by a healthy Puget Sound,” and the protection and 
restoration of Puget Sound habitat.145 EPA invited symposium partici-
pants and their “networks of knowledgeable people” to participate in the 
online collaboration, which took place over a 48-hour period.146 It ex-
  
The TSA Blog, Comment Policy, http://blog.tsa.gov/2008/01/comment-policy.html (Jan. 30, 2008).  
 141. The blog does not verify the identity of its commentators as non-governmental actors. 
Because the commentators typically write anonymously or via pseudonyms, the identities of those 
commentators are neither clear nor verified. 
 142. Wikipedia, Wikipedia:About, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About (last visited 
June 1, 2010).  
 143. Id. 
 144. The emerging Googlewave platform shares some similarities with wiki technology. On 
the one hand, Gmail users need only pick an email account name and password and Google does not 
authenticate their identity in any way. On the other, when Googlewave participants collaborate on a 
document, they own their work. When someone is editing something, the reader sees their edits 
shaded in a bright color; their names are affixed next to their edits. Readers may thus perhaps more 
easily identify the speaker on Googlewave than on Wikipedia’s history page.  
 145. PugetSoundMashup, Main Page, http://pugetsound.epageo.org/index.php5?title= 
Main_Page (last visited June 1, 2010).  
 146. See id. 
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plained that “[t]ogether, we can explore what works and what doesn’t 
work in accessing environmental information.”147  
The symposium’s wiki project sought participants from state gov-
ernments, local governments, Indian tribes, and industry.148 To partici-
pate, individuals needed to provide names and email addresses. It is un-
clear if the EPA checked to make sure that those names and email ad-
dresses were true.149 If so, particular entries and edits could not be attrib-
uted to particular speakers, at least not in any authenticated way. As 
EPA’s Chief Information Officer Molly O’Neill explained, the wiki gen-
erated “175 good contributions.”150  
Similarly, in 2007, the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) launched a program called Peer to Patent, which uses collabo-
rative software to facilitate participation in patent applications.151 The 
project allows individuals (who participate in groups) to discuss and pro-
vide intelligence on selected patent applications.152 Aided by collabora-
tive software, participants evaluate patent applications, discuss their in-
dependent research, and evaluate each others’ work.153 At the end of the 
process, participants submit their findings to the USPTO examiner.154  
Individuals join this endeavor by registering on the Peer to Patent 
website. Registration requires that individuals provide names and email 
addresses.155 As Beth Noveck explains, “though [individuals’] informa-
tion is not authenticated (a participant need not provide a credit card to 
corroborate his identity and may use a pseudonym to preserve anonym-
ity), a first name and last name rather than only a ‘handle’ are required in 
an effort to elevate the level of discourse.”156 Although the project identi-
fied the content provider’s name, its design left readers unable to know 
with certainty the actual identity of the speakers who participate, even 
though those speakers may have reputational incentives to use their ac-
tual names. The Peer to Patent site thus provided no way for the audi-
ence to differentiate governmental speakers from non-governmental 
ones.  
  
 147. Id. 
 148. Joab Jackson, Molly O’Neill: EPA the Web 2.0 Way, GOV’T COMPUTER NEWS, Jan. 29, 
2008, http://gcn.com/articles/2008/01/29/molly-oneill--epa-the-web-20-way.aspx?sc_lang=en.  
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. BETH SIMONE NOVECK, WIKI GOVERNMENT: HOW TECHNOLOGY CAN MAKE 
GOVERNMENT BETTER, DEMOCRACY STRONGER, AND CITIZENS MORE POWERFUL 73 (2009). 
 152. Id. at 74. 
 153. Id. at 83. 
 154. Id. at 78. 
 155. Id. at 73. 
 156. Id. 
2010] GOVERNMENT SPEECH 2.0 927 
B. Doctrinal Implications of Government’s Use of Transparent Tech-
nologies 
As Government 2.0 proceeds apace, private parties’ free speech 
clause claims will increasingly require courts to determine when gov-
ernment is speaking for itself and when it simply provides a means for 
individuals to express themselves. To that end, courts must assess gov-
ernment’s purpose and context in using online platforms to determine if 
contested expression is its own, and thus exempt from free speech clause 
scrutiny.  
This should be a relatively simple task when government expressly 
identifies postings, links, videos, photographs, and other expression as 
evincing and supporting its own positions. Transparent technologies—
both non-interactive and interactive—fall in this category as they provide 
the means for the audience to identify governmental speakers.157  
Consider, for example, Page v. Lexington County School District 
One.158 There, a public school board passed a resolution expressing its 
opposition to pending school voucher legislation, and authorized public 
communication of that position on the school district’s website as well as 
in emails and letters to parents and school employees.159 Voucher propo-
nent Randall Page then requested, among other things, that the district 
permit him to post his pro-voucher materials on its website.160  
When the district rejected his request, he filed a First Amendment 
suit, alleging (among other things) that the board’s decision to link its 
website to private organizations that shared the district’s opposition to 
the legislation had opened up its website as a type of forum for private 
parties’ speech from which he could not be excluded on the basis of 
viewpoint.161 The Fourth Circuit rejected Mr. Page’s claim, agreeing with 
the school district that the government speech doctrine permits it to 
communicate its own viewpoint through websites (and other means) 
without any obligation to allow others to alter that expression.162  
The facts in Page should make for a relatively easy decision be-
cause the design and context of the government’s website made clear to 
onlookers the government’s viewpoint and its identity as source of that 
particular viewpoint.163 So long as the government speaker makes clear 
  
 157. For a more detailed discussion of how speakers can expressly identify themselves as the 
source of a message, see Norton, supra note 79, at 604–06. 
 158. 531 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 159. Id. at 278–79. 
 160. Id. at 277. 
 161. Id. at 277–78. 
 162. Id. at 285 (“The School District included every link to other websites on its own initiative, 
and it did so only insofar as the link would buttress its own message. It thus retained sole control 
over its message.”). 
 163. In so holding, the Fourth Circuit relied primarily on the school board’s “establishment” 
and “control” of the message. See id. at 281–85. But the court also attended to the government’s 
 
928 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:4 
that it links to other speakers’ websites to support communication of its 
own position, those links should not transform our understanding of the 
government’s website as communicating anything other than the gov-
ernment’s own views. For example, we might think of websites and 
hyperlinks as electronic versions of the bulletin board in Downs v. Los 
Angeles Unified School District.164 There, after a school district estab-
lished a bulletin board inviting faculty and staff submissions to promote 
its celebration of Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month, a teacher sought to 
post materials on that bulletin board questioning the morality of homo-
sexuality.165 When the district refused his request, he filed suit and ar-
gued that the refusal constituted viewpoint discrimination impermissible 
under the First Amendment.166 The Ninth Circuit held that the school 
district’s choice to dedicate its bulletin board to a celebration of tolerance 
and diversity reflected the government’s own speech that it was entirely 
free to control.167  
As the Fourth Circuit noted in Page, moreover, a posting on a 
school district’s website reflects a situation very different from that in 
which a government agency uses interactive technologies for the express 
purpose of facilitating public discussion on a topic. Government could 
enable such discussions through live chats, chat rooms, or other plat-
forms designed to facilitate the ventilation of private views.168 There, 
First Amendment principles bar government from excluding or censoring 
participants on the basis of viewpoint.169 This would be true if, for exam-
ple, a government agency deleted an individual’s comments on its blog 
based on the person’s policy preferences. Nor, of course, could the gov-
ernment prevent private speakers from starting their own websites ex-
pressing their contrary views.  
To be sure, determining if the government is speaking for itself or if 
it is instead censoring viewpoints is sometimes difficult. For example, 
when a government formalizes its linking policy only after denying a 
hyperlink requested by a government critic, its actions may create doubt 
as to whether the government’s website policy is driven by an interest in 
communicating its own message or instead by a desire to muffle private 
  
transparent claim to the expression as its own. See id. at 284 (“[T]he School District continuously 
and unambiguously communicated a consistent message—its opposition to the Put Parents in Charge 
Act—and its providing references to others who shared that position was consistent with and sup-
ported the message, much as would a bibliography, a citation, or a footnote.”). 
 164. 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000).  
 165. Id. at 1005–06.  
 166. See id. at 1013.  
 167. See id. 
 168. See Page, 531 F.3d at 284–85; see also Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 334–
35 (1st Cir. 2009) (“It is possible there may be cases in which a government entity might open its 
website to private speech in such a way that its decisions on which links to allow on its website 
would be more aptly analyzed as government regulation of private speech.”). 
 169. Aden Fine, ACLU, Presentation at the U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security: Government 2.0: 
Privacy and Best Practices (June 23, 2009). 
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parties’ dissent.170 For this reason, the government speech doctrine 
should creative incentives for government to identify itself as the source 
of a particular message by requiring such transparency as a condition of 
claiming the defense.  
Consider the facts in Sutliffe v. Epping School District.171 The orga-
nizational plaintiff there described itself as “a perennial thorn in [the 
Town’s] side” that had been “engaged in a longstanding effort to curb 
what it [saw] as ‘profligate spending’ by the Town and its school dis-
trict.”172 The plaintiff filed a First Amendment claim after the town re-
jected its request to include its hyperlink on the town’s website, arguing 
(as in Page) that the town’s decision to link to certain other private web-
sites created a designated public forum from which the plaintiff could not 
be excluded on the basis of viewpoint.173  
There, the town had long owned and maintained a website that pro-
vided information on various town boards and commissions, town meet-
ings, and other government activities. The town’s Board of Selectmen 
determined which materials—including which hyperlinks to other web-
sites—would appear on the website.174 It had no written or other formal 
policy to guide or explain its linking decisions.175 The town argued, how-
ever, that its practice in making such decisions “was always to ‘provide 
information to the citizenry of the Town on Town business.’ The only 
links that were permitted were ones that ‘would promote providing in-
formation about the Town,’ and any links that were ‘political or advo-
cate[d] for certain candidates’ were not allowed.”176 After rejecting the 
plaintiff’s request, the town then established, for the first time, a written 
policy that limited hyperlinks on its website to sites either operated by 
other government agencies or that described “‘events and programs that 
are coordinated and/or sponsored by the Town of Epping.’”177 
Focusing primarily on the town’s establishment of the website and 
its control over the choice of hyperlinks to be included,178 the federal 
  
 170. For an example of the latter, see R. Johan Conrod, Linking Public Websites to the Public 
Forum, 87 VA. L. REV. 1007, 1007 (2001) (describing a Virginia city as “remov[ing] an online 
newspaper’s link to its official city website because it was unhappy with critical coverage it had 
received in the newspaper” while links to other newspapers and other media were allowed to re-
main). 
 171. 584 F.3d 314 (1st Cir. 2009).  
 172. Id. at 318 (first alteration in original). 
 173. See id. at 324. 
 174. Id. at 331. These included hyperlinks to the websites of ‘“governmental agencies and 
certain civic organizations,’ such as the New Hampshire Municipal Association, the Epping Middle 
High School, and the Exeter Area Chamber of Commerce” as well as to the website for “Speak Up, 
Epping!,” an event endorsed and supported by the town. Id. at 322. 
 175. See id. at 322. 
 176. Id. (alteration in original). 
 177. Id.  
 178. Id. at 331. 
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appellate court held that the town’s decision reflected government’s own 
expression free from First Amendment scrutiny:  
[I]n this case, the Town engaged in government speech by establish-
ing a town website and then selecting which hyperlinks to place on 
its website. The Town created a website to convey information about 
the Town to its citizens and the outside world and, by choosing only 
certain hyperlinks to place on that website, communicated an impor-
tant message about itself.179 
But here the government’s lack of a clear website policy invites 
suspicion that the town’s rejection of a linking request by a longtime and 
vocal critic might be motivated by distaste for dissent, rather than by a 
sincere interest in protecting its own message from distortion.180 Dissent-
ing Judge Torruella, for example, expressed concern that the town’s gov-
ernment speech defense might be a subterfuge manufactured after the 
fact to justify what was really viewpoint discrimination against a private 
speaker. Distinguishing Page as a case in which “it was clear that the 
government was engaging in its own speech activity,”181 he contrasted 
Sutliffe as a case in which: 
[T]he majority extends the doctrine to a situation where, in my view, 
it was not clear that the government was engaging in speech at the 
time it was acting, and only justified its actions after the fact. The 
majority's position has the potential of permitting a governmental en-
tity to engage in viewpoint discrimination in its own governmentally-
owned channels so long as the governmental entity can cast its ac-
tions as its own speech after the fact.182  
He urged instead that the inquiry focus on whether the public would 
understand the choice of hyperlinks to reflect the government’s own ex-
pression.183 
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of 
Cookeville184 presents a similarly challenging situation. The plaintiff—“a 
  
 179. Id. 
 180. See id. at 340 n.20 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (noting that counsel for the town at oral 
argument “struggled to justify the Town’s inclusion of a Chamber of Commerce link on the Town’s 
website, but not the plaintiffs’ website”). 
 181. See id. at 337. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 338 n.16 (“In my view, the better course is to adopt the test proposed by Justice 
Souter in his concurrence to Summum. . . . Justice Souter's test has the benefit of preventing ex post 
rationalization of viewpoint discrimination as government speech to avoid First Amendment scru-
tiny. Rather, the actions of the government would be evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable 
observer, and, as I note below, it is an open question whether a reasonable observer would construe 
the Town's actions as government speech, as opposed to the designation of a public forum or simple 
run-of-the-mill viewpoint discrimination.”). 
 184. (Putnam I), 221 F.3d 834 (6th Cir. 2000). 
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self-appointed eye on government corruption for the City”185—claimed 
that the city’s refusal to add a hyperlink to his website constituted im-
permissible viewpoint discrimination. For several years, the city’s web-
site included a “local links” page, to which local businesses were invited 
to add a link.186 At the time of the plaintiff’s request, the City had “no 
stated policy on who could be linked” to the city’s website, and had 
linked to a number of for-profit and non-profit entities based on deci-
sions made by the city’s computer operations manager.187 That manager 
recognized the controversial nature of the plaintiff’s request for a hyper-
link, and for the first time referred such a request to the city manager. 
The city manager initially decided to limit hyperlinks to non-profit orga-
nizations, but then (after the plaintiff informed him of his plans to con-
vert to nonprofit status) decided to limit links to those organizations that 
“promote the economic welfare, industry, commerce, and tourism” of the 
city.188  
In a decision that preceded the Supreme Court’s more detailed gov-
ernment speech decisions in Johanns and Summum by several years, the 
Putnam court never considered the possibility of government speech 
(and apparently the city did not raise such a defense). Characterizing the 
city’s website as a nonpublic forum,189 the court denied the city’s motion 
for summary judgment on whether its decision to exclude the plaintiff 
from such a forum was reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.190 A jury later 
ruled for the city, concluding that the plaintiff did not meet the defen-
dant’s newly-established eligibility requirements for receiving a hyper-
link in that his website did not promote economic development and tour-
ism.191 
Sutliffe and Putnam illustrate the Internet-age dangers of undue def-
erence to government’s claims that speech is its own. Certainly govern-
ment should be able to control its own transparently-chosen messages on 
its website (or elsewhere), as in Page. But governments’ lack of trans-
parency in Sutliffe and Putnam invites the “legitimate concern that the 
government speech doctrine not be used as a subterfuge for favoring 
certain private speakers over others based on viewpoint.”192 By insisting 
that the government be clear about when it is speaking, on the one hand, 
and when it intends instead to create an opportunity for private speech on 
  
 185. Id. at 838; see also Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville (Putnam II), 76 F. App’x 607, 
610–11 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 186. Putnam II, 76 F. App’x at 610. 
 187. Putnam I, 221 F.3d at 841; see also Putnam II, 76 F. App’x at 610–11. 
 188. Putnam II, 76 F. App’x at 610–11. 
 189. Putnam I, 221 F.3d at 845. 
 190. Id. at 846.  
 191. See Putnam II, 76 F. App’x at 609 (declining to overturn the jury’s verdict that the plain-
tiff did not meet the defendant’s eligibility requirements for receiving a hyperlink).  
 192. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009).  
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the other, courts can generate a principled and relatively easy solution 
from both a doctrinal and a technical perspective. 
These problems can generally be solved by government’s design 
choices. Government, in other words, can and should decide whether it 
plans to claim the speech as its own and affirmatively signal its author-
ship, or disclaim the speech and prepare to comply with traditional First 
Amendment principles. It can generally do so cheaply and easily.  
Indeed, some government actors already have done so as a matter of 
policy. As an example, USA.gov, an interagency initiative administered 
by the U.S. General Services Administration, has developed policies for 
federal agency websites that require transparent identification of gov-
ernment websites as the government’s own speech: 
Showing U.S. government sponsorship is one of the requirements for 
managing your agency’s website . . . . You should clearly display the 
name of your agency or organization on every web page to show visi-
tors who sponsors the website. Be sure it’s clear on every page that 
the site is maintained by the U.S. government. . . . By clearly display-
ing your agency’s name and sponsorship on every page of your web-
site, you’re clearly telling the public that your agency is accountable 
for the website’s content.193  
At the same time, governments at all levels can—and should—be 
equally transparent in disclaiming certain speech as its own. As a specific 
example: 
USA.gov can add a link to any government website that is publicly 
available unless directed not to by the agency that owns the site. . . . 
In rare instances, USA.gov links to websites that are not government-
owned or government-sponsored if these websites provide govern-
ment information and/or services in a way that is not available on an 
official government website. . . . The U.S. government . . . neither 
endorses nor guarantees in any way the external organizations, serv-
ices, advice, or products included in these website links. Further-
more, the U.S. government neither controls nor guarantees the accu-
racy, relevance, timeliness or completeness of the information con-
tained in non-government website links.194  
  
 193. USA.gov, Showing U.S. Sponsorship, http://www.usa.gov/webcontent/getting_started/ 
naming/sponsorship.shtml (last visited June 1, 2010); see also Department of Energy, Non-
Government Domains, http://cio.energy.gov/services/682.htm (last visited June 1, 2010) (“This 
requirement recognizes the proper performance of agency functions includes an obligation for clear 
and unambiguous public notification of the agency’s involvement in or sponsorship of its informa-
tion dissemination products including public websites.”). 
 194. USA.gov, Linking Policy, http://www.usa.gov/About/Linking_Policy.shtml (last visited 
June 1, 2010). 
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This policy makes clear the communicative function served by the gov-
ernment’s linking decisions in these specific contexts: to provide infor-
mation in a way that does not express government’s views.195  
As described above, courts have sometimes been befuddled by the 
significance of government’s links to third-party sites in the government 
speech context. The technology should not, however, make the issue a 
difficult one. Indeed, links may serve the same expressive function as the 
government speaker’s citation to a supportive reference in a policy paper. 
Instead, the challenge is whether the context of the link (or embedded 
YouTube video and the like) makes clear that the government has used 
online technologies to project its own views.  
Government can, and should, make its purpose transparent. The Of-
fice of Management and Budget, for example, has set forth policies re-
quiring federal agencies to establish and enforce agency-wide linking 
practices:  
You must also post a clear and comprehensive linking policy that ex-
plains your agency’s criteria for choosing external sites. . . . Linking 
to other websites is valuable since it brings additional visitors to 
those sites and can provide additional information and resources to 
your visitors. However, you need to have clear and fair criteria for 
deciding which links to use, particularly when another website owner 
asks you to link to them or trade links.196  
Consider, too, the TSA Blog that provides information related to the 
TSA’s mission and then invites members of the public to comment on 
the agency’s activities. The TSA’s own postings are clearly identified as 
government speech, and TSA retains complete power to control the ex-
pression of its own views. Postings by government employees appear 
beneath their names and affiliation with the TSA Blog, making clear that 
the TSA is the source of the expression.  
Where it enables public comments, however, TSA has created a 
designated public forum for the expression of private views, and has lim-
ited discussion to TSA matters. For instance, the TSA Blog explains that 
this feature’s purpose is to “facilitate an ongoing dialogue on innovations 
  
 195. If the government is not itself speaking, recall that traditional First Amendment principles 
then apply. For a discussion of how government might sell its choice of hyperlinks as a form of 
advertising, thus producing a revenue stream, see Pearson Liddell, Jr. et al., Government-Owned 
Web Sites and Free Enterprise: First Amendment Implications, 10 No. 4 J. INTERNET L. 1 (2006). 
Government’s sale of advertising space in brick-and-mortar facilities has been variously character-
ized as a designated public forum, a limited public forum, or a nonpublic forum. See Irene Segal 
Ayers, What Rudy Hasn’t Taken Credit For: First Amendment Limits on Regulation of Advertising 
on Government Property, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 607, 608 (2000) (discussing split in authority addressing 
government efforts to regulate transit advertising); Marc Rohr, The Ongoing Mystery of the Limited 
Public Forum, 33 NOVA L. REV. 299, 338–43 (2009) (discussing mixed results in transit-advertising 
cases).  
 196. USA.gov, Establishing a Linking Policy, http://www.usa.gov/webcontent/managing_ 
content/organizing/links/policy.shtml (last visited June 1, 2010) (emphasis added). 
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in security, technology and the checkpoint screening process.”197 The 
First Amendment does not permit TSA to edit comments based on view-
point—for example, by deleting posts critical of the government’s efforts 
on those topics. The Court’s limited public forum doctrine, however, 
does permit TSA to regulate public comments that fall outside the limits 
of the forum—by deleting posts on health care reform, or the World Se-
ries, or any other matter unrelated to TSA activities.198 As the TSA Blog 
explains, the TSA reviews all comments prior to posting and “will not 
post comments that are spam, are clearly ‘off topic’ or that promote serv-
ices or products.”199 
The TSA Blog demonstrates networked technologies’ great poten-
tial for facilitating government’s identification of itself as speaker as 
opposed to its decision to fashion a forum for private speech. Both non-
interactive and interactive technologies generally offer cheap and easy 
means to identify government’s own speech and that of private speakers 
engaged in a public forum. Significantly, digital technologies are often 
designed in ways that nudge government speakers to claim their expres-
sion. This is a great benefit of Government 2.0: networked technologies 
offer an inexpensive way to get government’s message to the public and 
to garner its feedback while clarifying when government is speaking.  
In short, government should, and inexpensively can, take care to en-
sure that the public knows whether and when the government intends to 
use its website to express itself or if it instead intends to create a desig-
nated public forum for the expression of ideas generally (or a limited 
public forum for expression on certain topics, or perhaps a nonpublic 
forum). Government should thus keep in mind—and plan for—this key 
question when designing policies for the use of websites, linking, and 2.0 
platforms: Do we (government) seek to engage in our own expressive 
conduct? Or are we providing some sort of opportunity for private 
speech?  
As Jack Balkin thoughtfully explains, design choices are crucial to 
the protection of free speech values in the twenty-first century.200 Gov-
  
 197. The TSA Blog, http://blog.tsa.gov/ (last visited June 1, 2010).  
 198. Some courts and commentators have urged that public forum doctrine additionally be 
understood to permit government to regulate private speech in various forums that is vulgar, odious, 
or otherwise particularly obnoxious. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, (Mis)Attribution, 87 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 833 (2010); Paul D. Wilson & Jennifer K. Alcarez, But it’s My Turn to Speak! When Can 
Unruly Speakers at Public Hearings Be Forced to Leave or Be Quiet?, 41 URB. LAW. 579, 585–87 
(2009) (discussing decisions in which courts did or did not permit regulation on such grounds). 
 199. The TSA Blog, Comment Policy, http://blog.tsa.gov/2008/01/comment-policy.html (last 
visited June 1, 2010). It also “expect[s] that all participants will treat each other, as well as our 
agency and employees, with respect” and will “not post comments that contain vulgar or abusive 
language; personal attacks of any kind; or offensive terms that target specific ethnic or racial 
groups.” Id. 
 200. Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427, 
443–44 (2009) (“In the digital age, judicial protection of First Amendment rights will remain quite 
important; but if I am correct about the trajectory of future policy debates, our attention will increas-
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ernment should thus coordinate with technologists to ensure that its on-
line presence explicitly informs the public when the hosted communica-
tions are its own. Governments can forestall subterfuge concerns by de-
liberating over, and establishing, a transparent policy that explains when 
it intends its website, blog, or social network site to express its own 
views and when it instead intends to create a public, designated, limited, 
or nonpublic forum.201 
C. Doctrinal Implications and Challenges of Government’s Use of 
Opaque Technologies 
Government’s increasing use of certain interactive technologies cre-
ates opportunities for greater government transparency and fewer 
anonymous bureaucrats, as government officials increasingly communi-
cate with the public by blog, YouTube, or podcasts that transparently 
indicate their governmental source.202 On the other hand, government’s 
reliance on technologies that obscure speakers’ identity carries the poten-
tial to frustrate government speech values by undermining the transpar-
ency, and thus the accountability, of government speech. This vulnerabil-
ity is most notably true of opaque interactive technologies that can hin-
der or prevent verification of the government as a message’s source—
e.g., when the government participates in anonymous or unauthenticated 
collaboration, such as the Peer to Patent groups and the Puget Sound 
wiki.203  
In our view, a commitment to the values appropriately protected by 
the government speech doctrine would preclude government from claim-
ing the government speech defense when it participates in opaque inter-
active technologies without clearly identifying itself as the speaker. Such 
a doctrinal adjustment should encourage government to be more trans-
parent when it is speaking and less likely to regulate based on viewpoint 
when it is not.204  
  
ingly shift to questions of design—both of institutions and technology—that are largely beyond 
judicial competence. The key players in ensuring free speech values in the digital age will be legisla-
tures, administrative agencies, and technologists.”). 
 201. Although the rules for assessing government’s permissible regulation of private speech 
vary with the forum designation, in none of them may government discriminate on the basis of 
viewpoint. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985); Perry 
Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983). 
 202. See Business 3.0, Obama’s Transparent and Connected Government, http://mybusiness-
network.blogspot.com/2009/01/transparent-and-connected-government.html (Jan. 6, 2009, 6:16 
AM). Indeed, similar parallels have emerged in the field of journalism, where previously faceless 
and often unreachable columnists and reporters are now readily accessible via e-mail, frequent 
blogging, etc. See Lili Levi, A New Model for Media Criticism: Lessons from the Schiavo Coverage, 
61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 665, 690 (2007) (“[B]logs sponsored by daily newspapers . . . serve as fora for 
interactive discussions between journalists, editors, and the public.”).  
 203. See supra notes 145–57 and accompanying text. 
 204. To be sure, many other transparency-forcing mechanisms remain available that we also 
support. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, Pub. L. No. 108-7, tit. VI, § 626, 117 
Stat. 11, 470 (2003) (prohibiting expenditure of federal funds to pay third parties to engage in gov-
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Consider, as just one example, government’s use of wiki technolo-
gies.205 As Jason Miller and Hannah Murray emphasize, “Wikipedia’s 
greatest weakness—that anybody can edit an article—is also its greatest 
strength.”206 This is because wikis and other opaque interactive technolo-
gies provide a cheap and easy way to facilitate peer production, a process 
by which often-anonymous individuals, whose actions are not coordi-
nated either by managers or by market price signals, jointly produce in-
formation.207 Peer production facilitates collaboration among radically 
diverse groups.208 Such diversity has enabled Wikipedia’s accuracy to 
rival that of the Encyclopedia Brittanica.209 As social media scholar Clay 
Shirky explains, Wikipedia is “the product not of collectivism but of 
unending argumentation. The articles grow not from harmonious thought 
but from constant scrutiny and emendation.”210  
No matter how effective opaque interactive technologies like wikis 
may be, however, they may prevent readers from identifying speakers’ 
actual identity.211 Government’s use of such technologies is troubling if 
government officials participate without identifying themselves: uniden-
tified authors prevent readers from using a message’s governmental 
source as a cue to its credibility.212  
  
ernment propaganda efforts without disclosing the messages’ governmental source); Leslie Gielow 
Jacobs, Bush, Obama and Beyond—Observations on the Prospect for Fact Checking Executive 
Department Threat Claims Before the Use of Force (Mar. 2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with the Denver University Law Review) (discussing possible means for encouraging greater ac-
countability by Article II speakers on national security issues). 
 205. The National Institute for Health (NIH), for example, is “encouraging its scientists and 
science writers to edit and even initiate Wikipedia articles in their fields” in response to the reality 
that many individuals turn to the web for health-related information. Ibby Caputo, NIH Staffers Get 
Into the Wiki World, WASH. POST, July 28, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/07/27/AR2009072701912.html. 
 206. Jason C. Miller & Hannah B. Murray, Wikipedia in Court: When and How Citing Wikipe-
dia and Other Consensus Websites is Appropriate, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). 
 207. Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of Information, 
52 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1256 (2003). 
 208. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 232 (2006). 
 209. See CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT 
ORGANIZATIONS 141 (2008). 
 210. Id. at 139. To be sure, diverse groups may sometimes produce better information and 
decisions than even experts. Nonetheless, Wikipedia shows that anonymous crowds can also be 
destructive. Consider journalist John Seigenthaler, Sr.’s struggles. In 2005, Seigenthaler discovered 
that one or more persons had created a Wikipedia biography for him that included false accusations 
of his involvement in the Kennedy assassination. Id. at 138. The entry was edited to strike out the 
false material, but by that time the false material had circulated for over half a year and thus “much 
of the damage had been done.” Id. Wikipedia now invokes editorial control to combat vandalism, 
often locking pages and editing. Id.  
 211. Although in this Article we focus on the dangers of anonymous government speech, 
private parties’ use of emerging technologies to engage in anonymous cyber harassment and similar 
behavior may inflict substantial harms of a very different type. See Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber 
Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 61 (2009) (describing use of internet technologies to threaten, 
defame, and harass women and other members of subordinated groups). 
 212. See Norton, supra note 79, at 592 (recounting evidence from cognitive psychology and 
related fields indicating that onlookers often use a message’s source as a heuristic for evaluating its 
quality); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 946 n.47 (2010) (Ste-
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Moreover, opaque interactive technologies also create possibilities 
for a type of deception known as “sock puppeting”—the creation of a 
“fake online identity to praise, defend or create the illusion of support for 
one’s self, allies or company.”213 When online collaborations guarantee 
anonymity, interested individuals, including government actors, can rig 
the “crowd,” ensuring the prominence of a particular view. To use an 
example from the private sector, John Mackey, the former chief execu-
tive of Whole Foods Market, used a fictional identity on the Yahoo mes-
sage boards for eight years to assail competition and promote his super-
market chain’s stock.214  
Indeed, Gia Lee has documented government’s efforts in more tra-
ditional expressive contexts to shape and thus manipulate public opinion 
by attributing government views to private actors—perceived as more 
credible or less self-interested on certain issues—through means such as 
government-produced “news” segments or op-eds distributed to and 
printed or aired by the media without acknowledgment of their govern-
mental source.215 As another example, recall the government’s produc-
tion of beef advertisements accompanied only by the label “Funded by 
America’s Beef Producers.”216 Government’s participation in opaque 
interactive technologies substantially increases opportunities for such 
manipulation at the expense of government accountability, as sock pup-
  
vens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting ARISTOTLE, POETICS 43–44 (M. Heath 
trans., Penguin Books 1996) (“In evaluating any utterance or action, one must take into account not 
just the moral qualities of what is actually done or said, but also the identity of the agent or speaker, 
the addressee, the occasion, the means, and the motive.”). 
 213. Brad Stone & Matt Richtel, The Hand that Controls the Sock Puppet Could Get Slapped, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/16/technology/16blog 
.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.  
 214. Id. Mr. Mackey used the online handle “Rahodeb” (an anagram of his wife’s name, Debo-
rah). Id. 
 215. See Lee, supra note 88, at 990. 
 216. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 577–78 (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(“[R]eaders would most naturally think that ads urging people to have beef for dinner were placed 
and paid for by the beef producers who stand to profit when beef is on the table. No one hearing a 
commercial for Pepsi or Levi’s thinks Uncle Sam is the man talking behind the curtain. Why would 
a person reading a beef ad think Uncle Sam was trying to make him eat more steak?”). Although 
unwilling to require government affirmatively to identify itself as the author of the message as a 
condition of claiming the government speech defense, the Supreme Court noted in Johanns the 
possibility of a different outcome if there were evidence that viewers actually misunderstood the 
message to be attributed to private parties—although it seemed quite unwilling to find such evi-
dence:  
Whether the individual respondents who are beef producers would be associated with 
speech labeled as coming from ‘America’s Beef Producers’ is a question on which the 
trial record is altogether silent. We have only the funding tagline itself, a trademarked 
term that, standing alone, is not sufficiently specific to convince a reasonable factfinder 
that any particular beef producer, or all beef producers, would be tarred with the content 
of each trademarked ad. 
Id. at 566 (majority opinion); see also Greene, supra note 198, at 834–836. 
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petry powerfully demonstrates how government might manipulate 
opaque interactive technologies in unaccountable ways.217  
The sock puppetry concern provides further justification for insist-
ing that government clearly identify itself as a message’s source if it 
wishes to claim the government speech defense. Government thus should 
not be allowed to claim the government speech defense when it partici-
pates in anonymous wikis and other opaque technologies that prevent its 
identification as speaker. For example, the government speech defense 
should not be available to a governmental body that anonymously edits 
wiki entries to tone down criticism of the government’s agenda because 
such speech is not transparently governmental. Indeed, such governmen-
tal censoring of private speech based on viewpoint violates the First 
Amendment.  
Even though participation in such technologies is typically anony-
mous, government can often choose to participate transparently in wikis. 
In a particularly promising development, perhaps one made in response 
to their prior efforts,218 the EPA issued “Interim Guidance Representing 
EPA Online Using Social Media” on January 26, 2010.219 In its Interim 
Guidance document, the EPA addressed the manner in which EPA em-
ployees and contractors working for the agency represent the agency 
online.220 As the guidance document explains, the “line between public 
and private, personal and professional can sometimes get blurred in on-
line social networks.”221 As a result, employees and contractors must 
remember that they are participating in their official capacity, not their 
personal one.222 Under the heading “Be transparent and honest,” the 
guidance document instructs:  
Do not comment or edit anonymously. Because you are working in 
your official EPA capacity, you can make reference to your EPA po-
sition and title. If you are a contractor, name your company and be 
clear that you are a contractor working on behalf of EPA and not an 
EPA employee.223 
It notes that in writing posts or commenting on non-EPA blogs or in 
editing a non-EPA wiki, employees and contractors must identify their 
EPA affiliation by identifying their title and by using their work email 
  
 217. For thoughtful discussion of the possibility that government may sometimes act as “ven-
triloquist,” deliberately masking its role as a message’s source in order to enhance the message’s 
credibility, see Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 49–52 (2000). 
 218. See supra notes 145–148 and accompanying text (describing EPA’s Puget Sound project). 
 219. Representing EPA Online Using Social Media, Web Guide, Jan. 26, 2010, 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/OEI/webguide.nsf/socialmedia/representing_epa_online. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
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address.224 Here the government has taken clear responsibility for its 
expression. This enables meaningful political accountability, and pro-
vides valuable information to the public consistent with the purposes of 
the government speech doctrine.  
Some may object that such a transparency-forcing doctrine un-
wisely discourages government from contributing to wikis and related 
opaque technologies that facilitate the production of valuable and more 
accurate information precisely because they permit anonymous contribu-
tions. That argument might be persuasive if we value government speech 
as simply a means to the end of information accuracy. Although govern-
ment speech may further the discovery of truth and dissemination of 
knowledge,225 its primary importance lies in another key First Amend-
ment value: facilitating democratic self-governance. In other words, 
“valuable” government speech in this context does not necessarily mean 
good, wise, or accurate speech.226  
In our view, government expression is valuable primarily because it 
gives the public more information with which to assess their government. 
For this reason, government speech is most valuable and least dangerous 
to the public—thus meriting exemption from First Amendment scru-
tiny—only when members of the public can identify the government as a 
message’s source, thus enabling them to more accurately assess the mes-
sage’s credibility and to take accountability measures as appropriate. 
This is true even if—and perhaps especially if—the public finds the gov-
ernment’s expression inaccurate or disagreeable. In short, the account-
ability harms of nontransparent government speech outweigh its accu-
racy-enhancing benefits.  
Of course, the more successful the government is at non-transparent 
behavior, the less likely we will learn of such activity. But sometimes we 
do find out—thanks to whistleblowers, intrepid public watchdogs, the 
government’s own indiscretion, or some other means.227 In any event, 
  
 224. Id. 
 225. For a discussion of the primary values to be served by the First Amendment, see Thomas 
I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CAL. L. REV. 422, 423 (1980) 
(“Over the years, we have come to view freedom of expression as essential to: (1) individual self-
fulfillment; (2) the advance of knowledge and the discovery of truth; (3) participation in decision-
making by all members of society; and (4) maintenance of the proper balance between stability and 
change.”). 
 226. For a different view, see Bezanson, supra note 48 (characterizing government speech as 
constitutionally valuable only when it is cognitive and reasoned, rather than aesthetic or emotional). 
 227. See Lee, supra note 88, at 983–88 (describing exposure of several instances of govern-
ment’s covert efforts to disseminate its policy agenda through nontransparent means); William E. 
Lee, Deep Background: Journalists, Sources, and the Perils of Leaking, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1453, 
1461 (2008) (describing “the importance of leaks in the democratic dialogue”); Mary-Rose Papan-
drea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National Security Information, 83 IND. 
L.J. 233, 233 (2008) (describing the government’s communication of information to the public 
through leaks); Letter from Anthony H. Gamboa, General Counsel, U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, to Senators Frank R. Lautenberg & Edward M. Kennedy (Sept. 30, 2005) (on file with Den-
ver University Law Review) (describing Bush Administration Department of Education’s violation 
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such a doctrinal change may more generally shape the norms for, and 
expectations of, government actors when they think through how and 
when they speak in social media contexts. Law has an expressive charac-
ter aside from its coercive one.228 It creates a public set of meanings and 
shared understandings between the state and the public.229 It signals ap-
propriate behavior, creating and sustaining norms.230 Law also clarifies 
government’s commitments: “Because law creates and shapes social 
mores, it has an important cultural impact that differs from its more di-
rect coercive effects.”231 
Reconsidering the government speech doctrine could change the 
way that government actors conduct themselves online. By emphasizing 
the importance of transparency in government expression, it could make 
clear to government actors that their online activities play a crucially 
important role in government’s larger effort in creating an informed and 
responsive citizenry.  
Doctrinal change can also influence the efforts of government offi-
cials. It might convince government decision-makers to adopt clear poli-
cies regarding government expression and private speech on their own 
blogs, websites, and social network sites. It might press them to do the 
same for employees using non-governmental social media in the manner 
that EPA did in its Interim Guidance document. It could convince gov-
ernment officials to devote resources to training personnel about the 
proper use of social media and means to enhance government transpar-
ency online. 
Law’s insistence upon transparency in the government speech doc-
trine would have a positive impact upon the public. Because individuals 
would see government making clear its policies and claiming its expres-
sion, the public would see the government owning its own words without 
subterfuge. By enhancing the public’s faith in government, individuals 
might be encouraged to participate in policy discussions. Indeed, Presi-
dent Obama ordered executive agencies and departments to use innova-
tive technologies precisely to invigorate public participation and collabo-
ration. 
  
of the covert propaganda ban by contracting with columnist Armstrong Williams “to comment 
regularly on the No Child Left Behind Act without assuring that the Department’s role was disclosed 
to the targeted audiences.”). 
 228. Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 
& n.10 (2000); see generally Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber 
Gender Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 407–414 (2009) (exploring law’s expressive value in 
addressing cyber gender harassment). 
 229. Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General 
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1571 (2000). 
 230. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 
(1996). 
 231. Citron, supra note 228, at 407. 
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CONCLUSION  
This Article seeks to start a conversation about whether our expec-
tations of government speech, and of government,232 should remain the 
same in light of changes in the way that government speaks. For now, we 
raise more questions than we answer. And those questions are many.  
For example, emerging technologies generate new controversies 
about government’s responsibility for the accessibility of its expression. 
In other words, how understandable must government expression be, and 
to what segment of the population? Considering this question requires 
that we weigh the availability (volume) of government speech against its 
accessibility (quality). Some take the view that the more government 
speech the better, and that government efforts to manage its raw data and 
other expression for quality or readability unacceptably slow the speed 
and reduce the volume of information received by the public.233 Others, 
in contrast, urge government to invest in greater accessibility and read-
ability of its data and other expression.234  
Note too that we may need to reconsider certain understandings of 
government speech. For example, in light of the dangers of closed source 
code when used by government programmers, should we consider gov-
ernment code a form of government speech—or instead as simply gov-
ernment decision-making, rather than expression, for which it remains 
constitutionally accountable?235  
This Article begins this conversation with a focus on ensuring that 
government remains meaningfully politically accountable to the public 
  
 232. For a thoughtful discussion of how the controversy over government speech reflects a 
controversy over the appropriate role of government more generally, see Steven D. Smith, Why is 
Government Speech Problematic? The Unnecessary Problem, the Unnoticed Problem, and the Big 
Problem, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 945 (2010). For an equally thoughtful response, see Alan Chen, 
Right Labels, Wrong Categories: Some Comments on Steven D. Smith’s Why is Government Speech 
Problematic?, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE (2010), http://denverlawreview.org/storage/Chen_Right 
Labels.pdf. 
 233. David Robinson, Harlan Yu, William P. Zeller, & Edward W. Felten, Government Data 
and the Invisible Hand, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 160, 160 (2009) (“If President Barack Obama’s new 
administration really wants to embrace the potential of Internet-enabled government transparency, it 
should follow a counter-intuitive but ultimately compelling strategy: reduce the federal role in pre-
senting important government information to citizens. Today, government bodies consider their own 
Web sites to be a higher priority than technical infrastructures that open up their data for others to 
use. We argue that this understanding is a mistake. It would be preferable for government to under-
stand providing reusable data, rather than providing Web sites, as the core of its online publishing 
responsibility.”).  
 234. Jerry Brito, Hack, Mash, & Peer: Crowdsourcing Government Transparency, 9 COLUM. 
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 119 (2008) (“In order to hold government accountable for its actions, citizens 
must know what those actions are. To that end, they must insist that government act openly and 
transparently to the greatest extent possible. In the twenty-first century, this entails making its data 
available online and easy to access.”).  
 235. See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Open Code Governance, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 355 
(2008); Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L.R. 1249, 1250 (2008) 
(urging that such government systems ought to be transparent to the public to promote accuracy, 
security, and privacy, among other values).  
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for its expressive choices, regardless of the form of communicative tech-
nology involved. It thus urges the revision of government speech doc-
trine to require that government make clear when it is speaking as a con-
dition of asserting the government speech defense. This requires gov-
ernment to make deliberate and transparent choices when designing web-
sites and engaging in other newer technologies to identify itself as a mes-
sage’s source when it seeks to speak, and to disclaim or otherwise make 
clear when it instead intends to create an expressive opportunity for oth-
ers.  
To be sure, the Court’s reluctance to require such transparency sig-
nals the possibility that it will respond to such challenges with continuing 
deference to government in the face of what might seem to it as difficult 
technological problems in identifying expression’s source. In addition to 
advancing key First Amendment interests in facilitating democratic self-
governance, however, revising the government speech doctrine as pro-
posed here may help generate some technological benefits as well. If the 
government speech doctrine is understood to bar government from using 
opaque technologies (at least as a condition of claiming the government 
speech defense), then we might see increased investments in technolo-
gies that would enhance transparency for expressive vehicles. Indeed, 
many are already working on identification technologies that facilitate 
communication with individuals whose identities have been authenti-
cated.236  
Ideally, technological innovation would foster greater transparency 
in several ways. It would permit us to confirm when government speaks 
and to prevent government from masking its identity as that of a private 
speaker. It would also permit us to discern when some other speaker is 
actually masquerading as the government.237 And it would permit us to 
demarcate particular portions and contributions of mixed public and pri-
vate speech—as in wikis—and to link them directly and transparently to 
government contributors.  
This is not to say that we have unfailing faith that this will happen. 
But as Paul Schwartz observed in a different context: “One of the ex-
traordinary aspects of the Internet . . . is its rapid rate of change. It is 
commonplace that each year online represents the equivalent of seven 
years of change in the normal, offline world.”238 Technical solutions that 
  
 236. See Lisa P. Ramsey, Brandjacking on Social Networks: Trademark Infringement by Im-
personation of Markholders, 58 BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (describing fake posts and other 
techniques by imposters seeking to create confusion about the source of information about particular 
corporate brands). 
 237. Note, for example, that some individuals with no governmental affiliation may create 
official-looking platforms, such as social network profiles, that purport to convey governmental 
messages—perhaps to besmirch governmental actors whose election (or re-election) efforts they 
want to undermine.  
 238. Paul M. Schwartz, From Victorian Secrets to Cyberspace Shaming, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1407, 1446 (2009). 
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facilitate the transparency of government expression may be around the 
corner.  
 
